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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING REAL ESTATE AND PARTNERSHIPS
I. PROPOSED 1992 LEGISLATION
H.R. 11. The following are the key real estate-and
partnership-oriented provisions of H.R. 11, which has been
approved by Congress and forwarded to the President, without
action yet (although actual or pocket veto is threatened) by the
President.
A. Modification of Passive Loss Rules. Under present law,
all rental real estate activities are treated as "passive
activities"; accordingly, it is immaterial whether or not the
taxpayer satisfies the material participation tests, which
includes spending at least 500 hours in real property operations.
A special rule permits the deduction of up to $25,000 of losses
from rental real estate activities (even though they are
considered passive), if the taxpayer "actively participates" in
them. This $25,000 amount is allowed for taxpayers with adjusted
gross incomes of $100,000 or less, and is phased out for
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $100,000 to $150,000.
Under H.R. 11, new Section 469(c) (7) would be added to
the Code. It would provide that the passive activity limitations
would not per se exclude taxpayers in real property trades or
businesses under certain circumstances, thereby enabling such
taxpayers to be subject to the same material participation tests
as other taxpayers. If the taxpayers can then meet those
material participation rules, they can offset rental real estate
income and losses against other income or losses in the same
manner as any other business person. The following rules would
apply to such taxpayers:
1. The term "passive activity" under Sec. 469(c) (2),
I.R.C. would not include any rental real estate activity of such
taxpayer for the taxable year.
2. This would be applicable to a taxpayer for a
taxable year if more than one-half of the personal services
performed in trades or businesses by the taxpayer are performed
in real property trade or businesses in which the taxpayer
materially participates.
a. "Real property trade or business" means any
real property development, redevelopment, construction
reconstruction, acquisition, conversion, rental, operation,
management, leasing or brokerage trade or business.
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b. Personal services performed as an employee
will only be treated as performed in a real property trade or
business if the employee is a 5 percent owner (as defined in Sec.
416(i)(1) (B), I.R.C.) in the employer.
c. In the case of a closely held C corporation,
these requirements are treated as met if more than 50 percent of
the gross receipts of such corporation for such taxable year are
derived from real property trades or businesses in which the
corporation materially participates.
3. Each interest of the taxpayer in rental real
estate will be treated as a separate activity, unless the
taxpayer elects to treat all interests in rental real estate as
one activity.
4. The question of whether the taxpayer materially
participates with respect to any interest in a limited
partnership as a limited partner is determined under the material
participation regulations.
B. Real Estate Investments by Pension Funds and Others.
1. Relaxation of "Debt-Financed Property" Rules.
H.R. 11 relaxes the rules for treating income from debt-financed
property as "unrelated business taxable income" ("UBTI") by
allowing (i) a leaseback of real property to the seller thereof
(or a related party) of no more than 25% of the leasable space
and the lease is on commercially reasonable terms, (ii) seller
financing on commercially reasonable terms and (iii) a
participation feature at the time of sale of no more than 30% of
the value of the property, and easing the requirements of fixed
sales pricing with respect to purchases from financial
institutions which acquired the property by foreclosure and
acquisitions from a financial institution at the time it goes
into conservatorship or receivership.
2. Repeal of Automatic "UBTI" Rule for Publicly-
Traded Partnerships. For purposes of the UBTI rules, H.R. 11
treats investments of a tax-exempt organization in a publicly-
traded partnership the same as an investment in any other
partnership.
3. Exclusion of Loan Commitment Fees and Option
Premiums from UBTI. Loan commitment fees and premiums from
unexercised options on real estate are excluded from UBTI.
4. Investments in REITS by Pension Funds. Under
current law, a pension trust is treated as one shareholder for
purposes of the "five or fewer rule" of ownership in a REIT.
H.R. 11 provides that each beneficiary of a pension trust holds
stock in the REIT in proportion to his or her actuarial interest
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in the pension plan. The Bill also modifies the treatment of
dividends from REITs for purposes of computing UBTI.
t C. Low-Income Housing Credit. H.R. 11 permanently extends
the low-income housing credit and allows an owner of a building
placed in service before 1990 to calculate the maximum allowable
rent based on either apartment size or family size.
D. Increase in Recovery Period for Real Property. H.R. 11
increases the depreciation recovery period for nonresidential
real property from 31.5 years to 40 years, effective as to
property placed in service on or after July 28, 1992, subject to
binding commitment and commencement of construction exceptions.
E. Discharge of Indebtedness and Reduction of Tax
Attributes. The interplay between Secs. 108 and 1017, which was
eliminated from the Code in TRA 1986, would be reinstated. Thus,
an individual taxpayer would have an election to exclude from
gross income certain income from the discharge of qualified real
property indebtedness. The amount so excluded could not exceed
the basis of certain depreciable real property of the taxpayer
and would be treated as a reduction in the basis of that
property. Partnerships and S corporations would be expressly
enabled to work with this provision. The provision would be
effective with respect to discharges after December 31, 1991 in
taxable years ending after that date.
F. Passive Activity Losses and Credits as a Tax Attribute
in Discharges of Indebtedness. Effective with respect to taxable
years beginning after December 1, 1992, passive activity loss and
credit carryovers from the taxable year of the discharge of
indebtedness are added to the list of tax attributes under Secs.
108(d) (8) and 1398(g), I.R.C., that are reduced in the case of a
discharge of indebtedness of the taxpayer that is excludable from
income under Sec. 108(a) (1), I.R.C.
G. Partnership Provisions. A number of changes are made
as to partnerships, including (1) simplified flow through of tax
items for large partnerships (that is, partnerships with at least
250 partners or electing partnerships with at least 100
partners), (2) simplified audit procedures for large partnerships
and (3) the requirement that a large partnership must furnish
information returns to partners by the first March 15 following
the close of the partnership's tax year. The first two of these
provisions are effective for partnership taxable years ending on
or after December 31, 1993, and the third is effective for
partnership taxable years ending on or after December 31, 1992.
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II. PROPOSED AND FINAL REGULATIONS
A. Sec. 108. I.R.C. (DischarQe of Indebtedness Income)
Prop. Reg. S1.108-2 is intended to provide rules
governing the treatment of an acquisition of indebtedness by a
person related to the debtor within the meaning of Sec. 267(b) or
Sec. 707(b)(1). Prop. Reg. S1.108-2(a) provides that the
acquisition of outstanding indebtedness by a person related to
the debtor from a person who is not related to the debtor results
in the realization of income by the debtor from discharge of
indebtedness. This rule will apply whether the acquisition of
the debt is direct or indirect, with an indirect acquisition
being a transaction in which the related holder acquired the debt
in anticipation of becoming related to the debtor. Prop. Reg.
Si.108-2(b)(2)(i). The amount of such income realization is
measured by reference to the fair market value of the
indebtedness on the date of acquisition.
The income realization rule of Prop. Reg. S1.108-2 is
made specifically inapplicable to a direct or indirect
acquisition of indebtedness with a stated maturity date on or
before the date that is one year from the date of acquisition if
the indebtedness is, in fact, retired on or before such stated
date. Prop. Reg. S1.108-2(d)(1). The rule is also inapplicable
to any direct or indirect acquisition in the ordinary course of
business by a securities dealer if the dealer (a) accounts for
the debt as a security held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business, (b) disposes of the debt within
a period consistent with the holding of the debt for sale to
customers in the ordinary course, and (c) does not transfer the
debt to a person related to the debtor, other than another
securities dealer satisfying the requirements of this exception.
If discharge of indebtedness income is realized by a
debtor under the provisions of Prop. Reg. §1.108-2(a), then the
debt is to be treated as new indebtedness issued by the debtor to
the related holder on the date of acquisition. The deemed
issuance price of the new indebtedness is equal to the fair
market value of such indebtedness. The excess of the stated
redemption price at maturity of the debt over the deemed issuance
price of the new debt is original issue discount, which is
subject to deduction by the debtor and inclusion by the holder.
The Proposed Regulations also establish a system of
"correlative adjustments" designed to reconcile the realization
of discharge of indebtedness income with the fact that the debt
remains outstanding in the hands of the related party. If the
debtor realizes discharge of indebtedness income, the debtor is
treated as having issued new debt to the related party holder
with an issue price equal to the fair market value of the deemed
new debt. The excess of the stated redemption price at maturity
- 4 -1615Mb".IF
of the deemed new debt over its issue price constitutes original
issue discount.
The preamble to the Proposed Regulations states that
the Treasury intends to issue regulations designed to prevent
elimination of discharge of indebtedness income in certain
nonrecognition transactions, including transactions described in
Secs. 332, 351, 368, 721 and 731. Such regulations will be
effective for any transaction on or after March 21, 1991.
However, in Notice 91-15, 1991-1 C.B. 519, the Service clarified
this portion of the preamble with respect to the transfer of
partnership debt to a partnership in exchange for a partnership
interest.
B. Sec. 468B, I.R.C. (Desicnated Settlement Funds).
Prop. Reg. §1.468B would subject a "qualified
settlement fund" to a tax on its gross income at the maximum rate
provided under Sec. 1(e), I.R.C. (currently 31%). Sec. 468B
already provides for a similar elective tax treatment of a
"designated settlement fund". Under the Proposed Regulation,
however, any designated settlement fund would be treated as a
qualified settlement fund, and the tax treatment set forth would,
under the Proposed Regulation, be mandatory, not elective.
A "qualified settlement fund" is defined by the
Proposed Regulation as any fund, account or other arrangement
which qualifies as a trust under applicable state law or the
assets of which are otherwise segregated from other assets of the
transferor pursuant to an order of, or which is approved or
supervised by, a Federal, state or local governmental authority
in order to resolve or satisfy claims arising out of tort, breach
of contract or violation of law, or under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.
Under the Proposed Regulation, the only deductions
available with respect to a qualified settlement fund are those
for administrative costs, and losses from the sale of assets or
worthlessness of property. The Proposed Regulation excludes any
deduction for operating expenses of any business assets held by a
fund.
C. Sec. 469, I.R.C. (Definition of "Activity").
1. PromulQation -- On May 12, 1992, the Service
promulgated Prop. Reg. §1.469-4, dealing with definition of an
"activity". In doing so, the Service allowed Temp. Reg. §1.469-
4T to sunset. As noted by the Service, the Temporary Regulations
were "criticized as overly long and complex, burdensome for small
taxpayers, and mechanically inflexible", and the Proposed
Regulations are "shorter and more flexible" and are intended to
"be easier to apply and ease the burden on small taxpayers".
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2. The Rules -- The following are the key
considerations in utilizing the Temporary Regulations and the
Proposed Regulations:
a. Although Congress never legislated a
definition of "activity", the legislative history of Section 469
indicates that an "activity" is meant to be the aggregation of
all undertakings which "consist of an integrated and interrelated
economic unit for the measurement of gain or loss". See S. Rep.
No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 739 (1986).
(1) Generally, more than one activity was
deemed toexist where two or more substantially different
products or services were provided.
(2) It should be noted that if the two or
more products or services are customarily, or for business
reasons, provided together (such as the clothing and appliance
sections of a department store), then a single activity may
exist.
(3) On the other hand, different stages of
producing and selling a particular product that are not carried
on in an integrated fashion will generally constitute separate
activities. S. Rep. No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 740
(1986).
(a) For example, the operation of a
retail gas station is an activity distinct from the extraction of
the raw materials via the drilling process.
(b) Likewise, the Senate believed that
real estate construction and development activities would be
considered as separate from the activity of leasing the building.
S. Rep. No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 743 (1986).
b. The following summarizes Temp. Reg.
§1.469-4T:
(1) It was generally reasonable to treat
operations that involved similar goods or services as part of the
same activity, though different operations could also be grouped
together if they were conducted at the same location and were
owned substantially by the same persons and in the same
proportions.
(2) However, it was not reasonable to treat
rental operations as part of a trade or business activity or to
treat non-rental operations as part of a rental activity unless
the operations are ancillary to the activity and insubstantial in
comparison to the activity. Temp. Reg. §l.469-4T(p)(2)(i), (ii).
Thus, real estate development and construction operations may not
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be treated as part of the rental activity even if the taxpayer
rents the property on completion of those operations. Notice 88-
94, 1988-2 C.B. 419.
c. Further focusing on Temp. Reg. §1.469-4T, as
to taxable years ending after August 9, 1989 and on or before
May 10, 1992, the definition of "activity" for purposes of
applying Section 469 was further dissected into "undertakings",
each of which is then either aggregated with other undertakings
to form an "activity" or is singled out to become an "activity"
by itself. Temp. Regs. S§l.469-4T(a) (2) (i) and (ii).
(1) Generally, an "undertaking" is a
business and rental operation that constitutes a separate source
of income production. Temp. Reg. §1.469-4T(c) (1).
(2) A separate source of income production
is those operations which are conducted at the same location
(that is, same physical structure or within close proximity) and
owned by the same person and which are income-producing
operations. Temp. Regs. SS1.469-4T(c)(2)(i)(A) and (B).
(a) Income-producing operations are
operations conducted at a location and relate to (1) the
production of property at that location; (2) the sale of property
to customers at that location; (3) the performance of services
for customers at that location; (4) transactions in which
customers take physical possession of property that is made
available for their use; or (5) or any other transactions where
customers are on the premises. Temp. Reg. S1.469-4T(c) (2) (iv).
(b) On the other hand, support
operations are those operations which are not income-producing
operations and which provide services or property at one location
for the benefit of the owner's operations at a different
location. Temp. Reg. S1.469-4T(c) (2)(ii)(B).
(i) Support operations may never
be considered to be activities. Temp. Reg. §1.469-
4T(c) (2) (ii) (A) (1).
(ii) However, the income and
expenses emanating from a support operation will be reasonably
allocated to the activity or activities it supports. Temp. Reg.
§1.469-4T(c) (2) (ii) (A) (2).
(3) Following the classification of business
and rental operations into undertakings, the taxpayer must next
separate his or her operations into three types of undertakings:
(x) trade or business undertakings; (y) rental real estate
undertakings; and (z) other rental undertakings.
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(a) Generally, each trade or business
undertaking is a separate activity unless there is mandatory
aggregation. Temp. Reg. §1.469-4T(a)(4)(i).
(b) On the other hand, trade or
business undertakings that are both similar and controlled by the
same interests are part of the same activity. Temp. Reg. §1.469-
4T(a) (4) (ii) (B).
(i) Undertakings are similar if
(1) more than 50% of the gross income of such undertakings is
attributable to operations in a single line of business or (2)
the undertakings are vertically integrated. Temp. Regs. S§1.469-
4T(f) (4) (i),(ii) and (iii). See Rev. Proc. 89-38, 1989-1 C.B.
920, for a sample list of 79 lines of business.
(ii) The determination of control
of any type, whether exercisable or exercised, depends on the
facts and circumstances, though it should be noted that there
will be a rebuttable presumption of control between two
undertakings if they are part of the same common ownership group.
Temp. Regs. S§§.469-4T(j) (1) and 1.469-4T(j) (2) (i).
(A) A common ownership group
is formed when the sum of the common ownership percentages of 5
or fewer persons (individuals or C corporations) exceeds 50%.
Temp. Reg. §l.469-4T(j)(2)(ii).
(B) A person's ownership
percentage in an undertaking is derived from three sources: (1)
direct ownership; (2) constructively ownership attributed through
Secs. 267(b) and 707(b)(1); and (3) ownership through a pass-
through entity. Temp. Reg. §1.469-4T(j) (3) (i) and 1.469-
4T(j) (3) (iii).
(c) A rental real estate undertaking is
an undertaking where at least 85% of the unadjusted basis of the
property made available for use by customers is real property.
Temp. Reg. §l.469-4T(k)(1)(ii).
(i) Rental real estate activities
may be aggregated or disaggregated for the most advantageous
consequences to the taxpayer subject to two caveats.
(A) First, if rental real
estate undertakings are held through a passthrough entity, a
taxpayer must keep the undertakings aggregated if the passthrough
entity does so. Temp. Reg. §1.469-4T(k)(2)(ii). In order to
provide their owners with maximum flexibility, partnerships and S
corporations should not show their rental real estate
undertakings aggregated on their informational returns.
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(B) Second, a taxpayer must
be consistent from year to year in the activity structure chosen.
Temp. Reg. §1.469-4T(k)(3).
(ii) A taxpayer with rental real
estate undertakings may also disaggregate a single undertaking
into multiple activities, which may all the taxpayer to free up
losses upon disposition.
d. The following summarizes Prop. Reg. Sl.469-4:
(1) "Trade or business activities" are
activities -- other than rental activities (as defined under
Temp. Reg. §1.469-lT(e)(3)) or activities treated under Temp.
Reg. §l.469-1T(e) (3) (vi) (B) as incidental to an activity of
holding property for investment -- that:
(a) Involve the conduct of a trade or
business (within the meaning of Section 162);
(b) Are conducted in anticipation of
the commencement of a trade or business; or
(c) Involve research or experimental
expenditures that are deductible under Sec. 174. Prop. Reg.
§1. 469-4 (b) (1).
(2) One or more trade or business activities
or rental activities are treated as a single activity if the
activities constitute an appropriate economic unit for the
measurement of gain or loss under Sec. 469. Prop. Reg. §1.469-
4(c) (1).
(a) Whether activities are treated as a
single activity generally depends on all the relevant facts and
circumstances. Prop. Reg. §1.469-4(c) (2).
(b) A taxpayer may use any reasonable
method of applying the relevant facts and circumstances in
grouping activities. Prop. Reg. §1.469-4(c)(2).
(c) The following factors, not all of
which are necessary to group more than one activity into a single
factor, are given the greatest weight in applying the facts and
circumstances:
(i) Similarities and differences
in types of business;
(ii) The extent of common control;
1615MPO9.IF - 9 -
The extent of common
ownership;
(iv) Geographical location; and
(v) Interdependencies between the
activities. Prop. Reg. §1.469-4(c)(2).
(3) A rental activity may not be grouped
with a trade or business activity unless one is insubstantial in
relation to the other. Prop. Reg. §1.469-4(d).
(4) An activity involving the rental of real
property and an activity involving the rental of personal
property (other than personal property provided in connection
with the real property) may not be treated as a single activity.
Prop. Reg. S1.469-4(e).
(5) Generally, a taxpayer who is a limited
partner or limited entrepreneur (under Sec. 464(e)(2)) may not
group that activity with any other activity. However, there are
exceptions where the grouping (1) will be with another activity
that is in the same type of business if the taxpayer is a limited
partner or limited entrepreneur in the other activity, or (2)
will be with another activity in the same type of business in
which the taxpayer is not a limited partner or limited
entrepreneur, but the grouping is appropriate under the facts and
circumstances. Prop. Reg. §1.469-4(f).
(6) Once the taxpayer has grouped
activities, consistency is required. Accordingly, the taxpayer
may not regroup such activities in subsequent taxable years
unless the original grouping was clearly inappropriate or there
has been a material change in the facts and circumstance. In
such an event, the taxpayer must regroup the activities,
complying with disclosure requirements. Prop. Reg. §1.469-4(g).
(7) The Service may regroup a taxpayer's
activities if the taxpayer's grouping fails to reflect one or
more economic units and one of the primary purposes of the
taxpayer's grouping is to circumvent the underlying purpose of
Sec. 469. Prop. Reg. §1.469-4(h).
(8) Partnerships or S corporations must
group their activities under Prop. Reg. §1.469-4. Then the
partner or shareholder does likewise as to the passthrough
entity's activities. Prop. Reg. §1.469-4(j).
(9) A partial disposition, as to a
substantial part of an activity, may be treated as a separate
activity if the income, deductions and credits allocable thereto
1615MPO9.IF
(iii)
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can be established with reasonable certainty by the taxpayer.
Prop. Reg. Sl.A69-4(k).
3. Effective Dates -- In Notice 88-94, 1988-2 C.B.
419, the Service announced that Temp. Reg. S1.469-4T allowed
taxpayers to organize their business and rental operations either
under the rules required for years beginning after August 10,
1989 or any other reasonable method. Temp. Reg. S1.469-4T(p)(1).
On May 12, 1992, the Service withdrew Temp. Reg. S1.469-4T and
promulgated Prop. Reg. §1.469-4, generally effective for taxable
years ending after May 10, 1992. For taxable years ending on or
before May 10, 1992, taxpayers must apply the rules of Temp. Reg.
§1.469-4T. [For years ending before August 9, 1989, any
disallowed deductions or credits may be allocated to a taxpayer's
activities (determined under the rules of Temp. Reg. S1.469-4T)
using any reasonable method. Temp. Reg. §l.469-4T(p) (3).]
D. Sec. 707(a)(2). I.R.C. (Transactions between Partners
and Partnerships).
1. Promulgation -- On April 25, 1991, the Proposed
Regulations on "disguised sales" of property between partners and
partnerships were issued. On September 30, 1992, the final
Regulations were issued.
2. In General -- Under Reg. S1.707-3(b)(1), a
partner's transfer of property to a partnership and the
partnership's transfer of money or other consideration to that
partner are deemed a sale of the property by the partner to the
partnership if
a. the transfer of money or other consideration
would not have been made by the partnership but for the partner's
transfer of property, and
b. either (1) the transfers are made
simultaneously, or, if not, (2) the partnership's distribution is
not dependent on the entrepreneurial risks of partnership
operations. Reg. S1.707-3(b) (1).
3. Presumption of Sale -- If, within a 2-year period,
there are both a contribution by a partner to the partnership and
a distribution by the partnership to that partner, these
"interrelated" transfers are presumed to be a sale of the
property to the partnership. Reg. §1.707-3(c)(1).
a. The presumption is rebuttable only if "the
facts and circumstances clearly establish that the transfers do
not constitute a sale." Reg. §1.707-3(c)(1).
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b. If (i) an unfavorable presumption exists, but
(ii) the partner nonetheless does not reflect the transaction as
a sale, and (iii) the transfer is not presumed to fall under
Regs. SS1.707-4(a)(l)(ii), (a)(3) or (b)(2) as a guaranteed
payment, reasonable preferred return or operating cash flow
distribution, then the partner must disclose the same on his tax
return for the year of the transfer. Regs. SS1.707-3(c)(2) and
-8.
c. If the contribution and distribution are more
than 2 years apart, then these transfers are presumed not to be a
sale of the contributed property, "unless the facts and
circumstances clearly establish that the transfers constitute a
sale." Reg. S1.707-3(d). See Reg. S1.707-3(f), Examples 5
through 7.
4. Factors Indicating Sale -- Over and above the
presumptions, Reg. S1.707-3(b)(2) sets forth 10 factors that
(although not exclusive) are considered evidence of the existence
of a sale, as follows:
a. The timing and amount of a subsequent
transfer are determinable with reasonable certainty at the time
of an earlier transfer. (Note that Reg. S1.707-3(c) (1)
disregards the order of the transfers.)
b. The transferor has a legally enforceable
right to the subsequent transfer.
c. The partner's right to receive the transfer
of money or other consideration is secured in any manner, taking
into account the period during which it is secured.
d. Any person has made or is legally obligated
to make contributions to the partnership in order to permit the
partnership to make the distribution.
e. Any person has loaned or has agreed to lend
the partnership the money or other consideration in order to
enable the partnership to make the transfer, taking into account
whether the lender's obligation is subject to contingencies
related to the results of partnership operations.
f. The partnership has incurred or is obligated
to incur debt to acquire the money or other consideration
necessary to permit it to make the transfer, taking into account
the likelihood that the partnership will be able to incur that
debt.
g. The partnership holds liquid assets, beyond
the reasonable needs of the business, that are expected to be
available to make the transfer.
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h. The partnership distributions or allocations
or control of partnership operations are designed to effect an
exchange of the burdens and benefits of ownership of the
contributed property.
i. The transfer of money or other consideration
by the partnership to the partner is disproportionately large in
relationship to the partner's general and continuing interest in
partnership profits.
j. The contributing partner has no obligation to
return or repay the money or other consideration to the
partnership, or, if such an obligation exists, it is likely to
become due at such a future time that the present value of that
obligation is small when compared with the amount of money or
other consideration transferred by the partnership to the
partner.
5. Guaranteed Payments -- A "guaranteed payment for
capital" (that is, any payment to a partner by a partnership
determined without regard to partnership income and for the use
of that partner's capital) is not treated as part of a sale of
property. Reg. S1.707-4(a)(1)(i).
a. The payment must be "reasonable". Reg.
1.707-4(a)(1)(ii). Reasonableness is considered as occurring,
irrespective of any other measurement, only if there is a written
provision of the partnership agreement providing for payment for
the use of capital in a reasonable amount. Reg. §1.707-
4(a) (3) (i). Whether the amount is reasonable is determined by
multiplying the partner's unreturned capital (including any
unpaid guaranteed payment or preferred return for any prior year)
at the beginning of the year by a "safe harbor" interest rate of
150 percent of the highest applicable Federal rate in effect from
the starting point through the end of the taxable year. Reg.
§1.707-4(a) (3) (ii).
b. The payment must be characterized as a
guaranteed payment. Reg. S1.707-4(a)(i)(ii). However, the
characterization will not control in actually making a
determination. Reg. S1.707-4(a) (1) (i).
6. Preferred Returns -- Preferred returns (which are
preferential distributions to a partner of partnership cash flow
with respect to capital contributed by the partner to the
partnership that are to be matched, to the extent available, by
an allocation of income or gain) are essentially treated the same
as guaranteed payments. Reg. §1.707-4(a) (2).
7. OperatinQ Cash Flow Distributions -- A
distribution of operating cash flow is presumed not to be part of
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a disguised sale unless the facts and circumstances clearly
establish otherwise. Reg. S1.707-4(b).
8. Reimbursements of Preformation Expenditures --
Under Reg. S1.707-4(d), payments made to reimburse partners for
capital expenditures that qualify as partnership organization and
syndication costs under Sec. 709, I.R.C. are not considered
proceeds of a disguised sale, so long as such reimbursement does
not exceed 20 percent of the value of the contributed property at
the time of the contribution (except that the 20 percent
limitation does not apply if the fair market value of the
contributed property does not exceed 120 percent of the partner's
adjusted basis in the contributed property at the time of
contribution). Reg. §1.707-4(d)(2)(ii).
9. Treatment of Liabilities -- Contributions of
encumbered property to a partnership may be treated as disguised
sales to the extent of the debt deemed shifted to noncontributing
partners, depending on whether the liability is a "qualified" or
"non-qualified" liability and on whether it is recourse or
nonrecourse. Reg. S1.707-5.
a. In contrast to the Proposed Regulations,
these Regulations interface with those under Sec. 752 as to the
recourse debt and, although not in full, nonrecourse debt. Regs.
SS1.707-5(a)(2)(ii) and (iii).
b. A liability is a "qualified liability" if and
to the extent that it meets one of the following tests:
(1) The liability was incurred by the
partner more than 2 years prior to the earlier of (x) the date of
contribution of the property or (y) the date the partner agreed
in writing to contribute the property, and such liability has
encumbered the property throughout the 2-year period. Reg.
§1.707-5(a) (6) (i) (A).
(2) The debt was incurred by the partner
within the 2-year period prior to the earlier of (x) the date of
contribution to the partnership or (y) the date of the agreement
in writing to contribute the property, and such liability has
encumbered the property throughout the period since it was
incurred, but the facts and circumstances clearly establish that
the liability was not incurred in anticipation of the
contribution. Reg. S1.707-5(a) (6)(i)(B).
(3) The debt is allocable, under the
interest-tracing rules of Temp. Reg. §1.163-8T, to capital
expenditures incurred with respect to the contributed property.
Reg. §1.707-5(a) (6) (i) (C).
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(4) The debt was incurred in the ordinary
course of the trade or business in which the contributed property
was used or held; provided, however, that substantially all of
the assets of such activity must be contributed to the
partnership; and provided, further, that, if the liability is a
recourse liability, the amount of the liability does not exceed
the fair market value of the transferred property (net of other
applicable liabilities senior in priority) at the time of the
transfer. Reg. S1.707-5(a) (6) (i) (D).
10. Effective Dates -- Under Reg. §1.707-9(a) (1), the
Regulations apply to any transaction with respect to which all
transfers that are part of a sale of an item of property occur
after April 24, 1992. However, the Proposed Regulations may be
applied to any such transaction so long as at least one of the
transfers considered part of a sale occurs before November 30,
1992. Transactions occurring in whole or in part before April
25, 1991 and, generally, after March 31, 1984 are determined on
the basis of Sec. 707(a)(2) itself and the legislative history of
the 1984 Tax Reform Act provision changing Sec. 707(a)(2).
E. Sec. 752(c), I.R.C. (Allocations of Partnership
Liabilities among Partners for Basis Purposes).
1. Perspective -- The new Sec. 752 Regulations boil
down to the simple proposition that, in allocating basis
attributable to partnership liabilities among partners, the focus
is on the economic risk of loss.
a. Generally, partnership liabilities are
allocated among those partners who will bear the economic risk of
loss with respect to those liabilities.
b. If a person "related" to a partner will bear
the economic risk of loss, then, subject to a de minimis
exception, that partner is deemed to bear the economic risk of
loss.
c. True nonrecourse liabilities (that is,
partnership liabilities with respect to which no partner and no
person "related" to a partner bears any economic risk of loss)
are allocated among the partners in proportion to their shares of
partnership profits (as was the case under Reg. S1.752-l(e) prior
to the new Sec. 752 Regulations).
2. Definitions. For purposes of Sec. 752, I.R.C.,
the following definitions apply (under Reg. §1.752-1(a)):
a. Recourse Liability -- A partnership liability
is a recourse liability to the extent that a partner or related
person bears the economic risk of loss for that liability under
Reg. S1.752-2.
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b. Nonrecourse Liability -- A partnership
liability is a nonrecourse liability to the extent that no
partner or related person bears the economic risk of loss for
that liability under Reg. S1.752-2.
c. Related Person --
(1) Under Reg. S1.752-4(b) (1), a related
person is a person who bears a relationship to the partner
described in Sec. 267(b) or 707(b)(1), I.R.C., with the following
modifications:
(a) substitute "80 percent or more" for
"more than 50 percent" each place it appears in those Sections;
(b) a person's family is determined by
excluding brothers and sisters; and
(c) the affiliated group rules of Secs.
267(e)(1) and 267(f) (1) (A), I.R.C. are disregarded.
Thus, related persons would include:
(i) A partner and a partnership
in which the partner owns 80 percent or more of the capital or
profits interest.
(ii) An individual and a
corporation in which the individual owns 80 percent or more of
the value of the stock.
(iii) A husband and wife.
(iv) A parent and child.
(v) Two partnerships in which the
same persons own 80 percent or more of the capital or profits in
interests.
(vi) A partnership and a
corporation having common ownership of 80 percent or more.
(2) If a person is related to more than one
partner, then such person's payment or contribution obligation,
or right to reimbursement, is allocated to the partner with the
highest percentage of related ownership. If two or more partners
are related to such person in the same percentage, then such
person's payment or contribution obligation, or right to
reimbursement, is allocated equally among such persons. Reg.
§1.752-4(b) (2) (i).
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(3) Natural persons who are related by
virtue of being members of the same family are treated as having
a percentage relationship of 100 percent to each other. Reg.
§1.752-4(b) (2) (ii).
(4) If related persons directly or
indirectly own interests in the same partnership, they are not
treated as related persons for purposes of determining the
economic risk of loss borne by each of them as to partnership
liabilities. Reg. §1.752-4(b)(2)(iii).
(5) A special rule prevents the use of
entities to avoid the related person rules, as follows:
(a) If (i) a partnership liability is
owed to or guaranteed by another entity that is a partnership, an
S corporation, a C corporation or a trust; and (ii) a partner or
related person directly or indirectly owns a 20 percent or more
ownership interest in the other entity; and (iii) a principal
purpose of having the other entity act as a lender or guarantor
was to avoid the determination that the partner that owns the
interest bears economic risk of loss, then the partner is treated
as holding the other entity's interest as a creditor or guarantor
to the extent of the partner's or related person's ownership
interest in the entity. Reg. §1.752-4(b) (2) (iv) (A).
(b) As an example, assume that X, Y and
Z form general partnership XYZ, in which they are equal partners,
contributing $1,000 each to the partnership. X and Y, who want
to lend money to partnership XYZ and have the loan treated as
nonrecourse, form new partnership XY, and contribute $50,000 each
to the same. X and Y share losses equally in partnership XY.
Partnership XYZ borrows $100,000 from partnership XY on a
nonrecourse basis, secured by the property which partnership XYZ
buys with the loan. Under these facts, X and Y are considered to
bear the economic risk of loss with respect to the partnership
XYZ borrowing from partnership XY, equally, based on their
ownership interests in partnership XY. See Reg. §1.752-
4 (b) (2) (iv) (C).
(6) Debt is taken into account only once,
even though a partner may be liable for such debt both as a
partner and in a capacity other than as a partner, such as a
guarantor, indemnitor, tenant or borrower. Reg. §1.752-4(c).
3. Assumptions of or Taking Subject to Liabilities.
a. Increases and Decreases in Partner's Share of
Liabilities -- Under Reg. §1.752-1(b), any increase in a
partner's share of partnership liabilities, or any increase in a
partner's individual liabilities by reason of the partner's
assumption of partnership liabilities, is treated as a
contribution of money by that partner to the partnership; and,
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under Reg. §1.752-1(c), any decrease in the same is treated as a
distribution of money by the partnership to that partner.
b. Assumption of Liability -- Except as
otherwise provided in Reg. S1.752-2(e), a person is considered to
assume a liability only to the extent that:
(1) The assuming person is personally
obligated to pay the liability; and
(2) In the case of any assumption of a
partnership liability by a partner, the person to whom such
liability is owed (x) knows of the assumption and (y) can
directly enforce the partner's or related person's obligation
with respect to such liability, and no other partner or related
person to another partner would bear the economic risk of loss
for such liability immediately after the assumption. Reg.
S1.752-2 (d).
c. Property Subject to a Liability -- If
property is contributed to a partnership by a partner or
distributed by a partnership to a partner, and such property is
subject to a liability of the transferor, the transferee is
considered to have assumed such liability to the extent that the
amount of such liability does not exceed the fair market value of
the property at the time of the contribution or distribution.
Reg. S1.752-2(e).
(1) As an example, assume that A contributes
property with an adjusted basis of $1,000 to a general
partnership for a one-third interest in the partnership. At the
time of contribution, the property is subject to recourse debt of
$150 and has a fair market value in excess of $150. As a result
of the contribution, A's individual liabilities decrease by $150,
but his share of partnership liabilities increases by $150,
because he is personally liable on the debt and, thus, has
economic risk of loss. There is no net increase or decrease in
A's individual liabilities and share of partnership liabilities.
Accordingly, A's basis for his general partner interest is $1,000
(the same as A's basis for the contributed property).
(2) As a further example, assume that B
contributes property with an adjusted basis of $1,000 to a
general partnership for a one-half interest. At the time of
contribution, the property is subject to nonrecourse debt of
$2,500 and has a fair market value in excess of $2,500. Because
no partner will bear the risk of loss for the nonrecourse
liability, the liability will be a nonrecourse liability of the
partnership. B's individual liabilities decrease by $2,500, but
B's share of partnership liabilities increases by $2,000 (that
is, $1,500 allocable to B under Sec. 704(c) if the partnership
were to dispose of the property in a taxable transaction in full
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satisfaction of the nonrecourse debt, plus $500, which is B's
share of the excess of the nonrecourse liability over the Sec.
704(c) gain). Accordingly, B's basis in his partnership interest
is $500, which is the $1,000 basis for the contributed property
less the $500 net decrease in liabilities (considered a
distribution of money to B).
(3) See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9015016 (January 9,
1990), where assets were contributed to a partnership by
individuals, who expressly agreed in the partnership agreement
that they would remain solely liable on the deeds of trust
encumbering such assets (and they would indemnify and hold
harmless their other partners from any loss on theosame). The
partnership agreement expressly stated that the partnership did
not assume any of the liabilities. Because there was no net
change in any of the contributing partners' liabilities resulting
from the contribution, there was no deemed distribution (or
contribution) of money.
d. Netting of Increases and Decreases in
Liabilities Resulting from Same Transaction -- If as a result of
a single transaction -- such as a contribution by a partner to a
partnership of property subject to a liability or the termination
of a partnership under Sec. 708(b), I.R.C. -- a partner incurs
both an increase (or decrease) in the partner's share of a
partnership liabilities and a decrease (or increase) in the
partner's individual liabilities, then
(1) Such increase and decrease must be
offset against each other; and
(2) Only the net increase or decrease is
taken into account in calculating any contribution of money to
the partnership by such partner or distribution of money by the
partnership to such partner. Reg. §1.752-2(f).
e. Bifurcation of Liabilities -- If one or more
partners bear economic risk of loss for a part, but not all, of a
partnership liability, then such liability is considered recourse
only to such extent, and is considered nonrecourse as to the
remainder thereof. Reg. S1.752-2(h). See Reg. §1.752-2(f),
Example 5. See also Rev. Rul. 84-118, 1984-2 C.B. 120.
4. "Recourse" Liabilities.
a. In General -- A partner's share of any
recourse liability of the partnership is equal to the portion, if
any, of the economic risk of loss for such liability that is
borne by such partner. Reg. §1.752-2(a).
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b. Obligation to Make Payment -- Generally, a
partner bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership
liability to the extent that the partner or a related person
would be obligated to make either (i) a payment to any person or
(ii) a contribution to the partnership with respect to such
liability, if in either case the partnership constructively
liquidated at that time, and the partner or related person would
not be entitled to reimbursement from another partner or person
related to another partner.
c. Constructive Liauidation -- On a constructive
liquidation of a partnership, the following events are deemed,
under Reg. S1.752-2(b)(1), to occur simultaneously:
(1) All of the partnership liabilities
become payable in full.
(2) All of the assets of the partnership
become worthless.
(a) This excludes money or other
separate property contributed by a partner for use by the
partnership solely to secure the payment of a partnership
liability. Regs. SS1.752-2(h) (1) and (2).
(b) These assets are treated as though
they still belong to the contributing partner if substantially
all of the items of income, gain, loss and deduction attributable
to the contributed property are allocated to the contributing
partner, and this allocation is greater than the partner's share
of any other significant item of the same. Reg. S1.752-2(h) (2).
(c) A promissory note of a partner or a
related person that is pledged or contributed to the partnership
is not taken into account unless the note is readily tradeable on
an established securities market. Reg. §1.752-2(h) (4).
(3) The partnership disposes of all of its
property in a fully taxable exchange for no consideration (other
than relief of liabilities for which the creditor's right to
repayment is limited solely to one or more assets of the
partnership).
(4) All items of income, gain, loss and
deduction are allocated among the partners.
(5) The partnership liquidates.
d. Treatment on Deemed Disposition -- On a
constructive liquidation, the deemed disposition of the
partnership's assets results in gain or loss as follows (under
Reg. §1.752-2(b)(2)):
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(1) Where a creditor's right to repayment of
a partnership liability is limited solely to one or more
partnership assets, the difference between (x) the amount of the
liability extinguished by the deemed disposition and (y) the tax
basis in those assets is the recognized gain or loss.
(2) A loss is recognized equal to any
remaining tax basis of the partnership's assets.
e. Obligations Recognized --
(1) The facts and circumstances at the time
of determination govern as to the extent to which a partner or
related person has an obligation to make a payment. Reg. §1.752-
2(b) (3).
(2) All statutory and contractual
obligations are taken into account. Reg. S1.752-2(b)(3). These
include:
(a) Contractual obligations outside the
partnership agreement, such as guarantees, indemnifications,
reimbursement agreements and other obligations directly to
creditors.
(b) Obligations to the partnership
under the partnership documents, such as capital contribution
requirements and deficit restoration obligations.
(c) Payment obligations imposed by
state law.
(3) If an obligation is not recognized under
Reg. §1.752-2(b) (3), then it is not considered an obligation to
make a payment for any purpose of Reg. §1.752-2(b).
f. Contingent Obligations --
(1) An obligation is disregarded if, under
the facts and circumstances, it is subject to contingencies that
make it unlikely that the obligation will ever be discharged.
Reg. S1.752-2(b)(4). See Albany Car Wheel Co., Inc. v. Comm'r,
40 T.C. 831 (1963), aff'd 333 F.2d 653 (CA2 1964).
(2) If an obligation would arise in the
future after the occurrence of an event that is not determinable
with reasonable certainty, the obligation is ignored until the
event occurs. See Pierce Estates, Inc. v. Comm'r, 195 F.2d 475
(CA3 1952), and Rev. Rul. 80-235, 1980-2 C.B. 299. See also Reg.
§1.752-2(f), Example 8.
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g. Reimbursement Rights -- A partner's or
related person's obligation to make a payment with respect to a
partnership liability is decreased to the extent of the right to
reimbursement from another partner or a person who is a related
person to another partner. Reg. §1.752-2(b)(5).
(1) For this and all other obligation
purposes, it is assumed, under Reg. S1.752-2(b) (6), that all
partners and related persons with obligations to make payments
will actually perform the same, irrespective of their actual net
worths, unless the facts and circumstances indicate a plan to
circumvent or avoid the situation. (Refer to the anti-abuse
rules under Reg. §1.752-2(j)).
(2) See Reg. S1.752-2(f), Examples 3 and 4,
as to reimbursement rights under state law.
h. Recourse Interest on Nonrecourse Liability
(1) If one or more partners or related
persons have guaranteed the payment of more than 25 percent of
the total interest that will accrue on any nonrecourse liability
of the partnership during its remaining term, and it is
reasonable to expect that the guarantor(s) will be required to
pay substantially all of the guaranteed future interest if the
partnership fails to do so, then each such partner's economic
risk of loss is increased by the present value of the remaining
interest payments that such partner or related person would be
required so to make. Reg. S1.752-2(e)(1). See Reg. S1.752-2(f),
Example 7.
(a) The remainder of the principal
amount of the partnership liability constitutes a nonrecourse
liability. Reg. §1.752-2(e)(1).
(b) If, upon a default in payment by
the partnership, the lender would not have to foreclose on the
property in order to enforce a guaranty, then it is reasonable to
expect the guarantor(s) will have to pay substantially all of the
guaranteed future interest. Reg. §1.752-2(e) (1).
(2) The present value of any interest
payment is determined by assuming that such payment will be made
when due and by using a discount rate equal to
(a) The rate at which such interest
payment accrues on the liability; or
(b) The applicable Federal rate,
compounded semi-annually. Reg. §1.752-2(e)(2).
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(3) This rule does not apply to a
partnership nonrecourse liability if the guarantee of interest by
the partner or related person is for a period not in excess of
the lesser of (x) 5 years or (y) one-third (1/3) of the term of
the lease. Reg. S1.752-2(e) (3).
i. Time Value of Money Considerations -- In
determining the extent to which a partner or related person bears
the economic risk of loss, there must be taken into account any
delay in the time when a payment or contribution obligation with
respect to a partnership liability is to be satisfied. Reg.
S1.752-2(g) (1).
(1) The obligation is recognized only to the
extent of its "value" if either:
(a) a payment obligation is not
required to be satisfied within a reasonable time after it
becomes due and payable, or
(b) a contribution obligation is not
required to be satisfied before the later of (i) the end of the
year in which the partner's interest is liquidated, or (ii) 90
days after the liquidation. Reg. S1.752-2(g)(1).
(2) The value of a payment or contribution
obligation not required to be satisfied within the above time
period is considered to be the "face amount" (that is, the entire
principal balance) only if the obligation bears interest at least
at the applicable Federal rate under Sec. 1274(d), I.R.C.
Otherwise, the obligation is discounted to present value under
the rules of Sec. 1274, I.R.C. Reg. S1.752-2(g) (2).
j. Anti-Abuse Rules --
(1) The facts and circumstances will be a
potential override to arrangements between the parties. Reg.
Si.752-2(j) (1).
(2) An obligation of a partner or related
person may, thus, be disregarded or treated as an obligation of
another person if the facts and circumstances indicate that a
principal purpose of the arrangement is to eliminate the
partner's economic risk of loss or to create the appearance of a
partner or related person bearing the economic risk of loss when,
in fact, the substance is otherwise. Reg. §1.752-2(j) (1).
(3) A number of arrangements are considered
tantamount to a guarantee. Ultimately, one must look to the
relative economic burdens for the liability under the contractual
obligations. Reg. §1.752-2(j)(2).
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(4) An obligation of a partner to make a
payment is not recognized if the facts and circumstances indicate
a plan to circumvent or avoid the obligation. Regs. SS1.752-
2(j)(3) and (4), Example.
5. Partner or Related Person as Lender.
a. A partner is deemed to bear the economic risk
of loss for a partnership liability to the extent that the
partner or a related person makes, or acquires an interest in, a
nonrecourse loan to the partnership, so long as the economic risk
of loss for that liability is not borne by another partner. Reg.
S1.752-2(c)(l). Contrast Sec. 465(b)(6), I.R.C.
b. If a partnership liability is owed to a
partner or related person and that liability includes (or is
"wrapped" around) a nonrecourse obligation encumbering
partnership property that is owed to another person, the
partnership liability is bifurcated into two separate
liabilities, and the wrapped debt is considered owed to another
person. Reg. S1.752-2(c)(2). See Reg. S1.752-2(f), Example 6.
c. The general rule above does not apply if (i)
the nonrecourse loan is made to the partnership or guaranteed on
behalf of the partnership by a partner or related person whose
direct or indirect interest in each item of partnership income,
gain, loss, deduction or credit for any taxable year is 10
percent or less and (ii) the loan constitutes "qualified
nonrecourse financing" under Sec. 465(b)(6), I.R.C. Regs.
SS1.752-2(d) (1) and (2). See Reg. §1.752-2(f), Example 5.
6. "Nonrecourse" Liabilities.
a. Under Reg. S1.752-3(a), a partner's share of
the nonrecourse liabilities of a partnership equals the sum of
(1) The partner's share of partnership
minimum gain under Sec. 704(b), I.R.C. and the Regulations
thereunder (see Reg. S1.752-3(b), Example 1);
(2) The amount of any taxable gain that
would be allocated to the partner under Sec. 704(c), I.R.C., or
in the same manner as under Sec. 704(c) in connection with a
revaluation of partnership property, if the partnership, in a
taxable transaction, disposed of all partnership property subject
to nonrecourse liabilities of the partnership in full
satisfaction of such liabilities and for no other consideration;
and
(3) The partner's proportionate share of the
excess nonrecourse liabilities of the partnership. See Reg.
§1.752-3(b), Example 2. [The excess nonrecourse liabilities
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equal the excess of the total nonrecourse liabilities of the
partnership over those attributed to partnership. minimum gain or
Sec. 704(c) gain and, as such, allocable to the partners.]
b. The partners generally share nonrecourse
liabilities in accordance with their interests in partnership
profits. Reg. §1.752-3(a) (3).
(1) In determining the partners' interests
in partnership profits, all facts and circumstances relating to
the economic arrangement of the partners are taken into account.
Reg. §1.752-3(a) (3).
(2) The interests in partnership profits
specified in the partnership agreement will govern, so long as
the interests so specified are reasonably consistent with
allocations (which have substantial economic effect) of some
other significant item of partnership income or gain among such
partners. Reg. S1.752-3(a)(3).
7. Tiered Partnerships. Where a partnership (the
"upper-tier partnership") is a partner in another partnership
(the "subsidiary partnership"), the upper-tier partnership's
share of the liabilities of the subsidiary partnership -- other
than any liability owed by the subsidiary partnership to the
upper-tier partnership -- is treated as liabilities of the upper-
tier partnership for purposes of applying Sec. 752, I.R.C. to the
partners of the upper-tier partnership. Regs. SS1.752-4(a) and
2(i). See also Rev. Rul. 87-115, 1987-2 C.B. 163.
8. Effective Date.
a. In General -- These Proposed Regulations
apply to any liability incurred or assumed by a partnership on or
after December 28, 1991, other than a liability incurred or
assumed by the partnership pursuant to a written binding contract
in effect prior to December 28, 1991 and at all times thereafter.
Reg. §1.752-5(a).
b. Election -- Whether or not any liabilities
have been assumed or incurred during such taxable year, a
partnership may elect to apply these Proposed Regulations as of
the beginning of the first taxable year of the partnership ending
on or after December 28, 1991. Reg. §1.752-5(b) (1).
c. Effect of Partnership Termination under Sec.
708(b) (1)(B). I.R.C. -- A termination of the partnership under
Sec. 708(b) (1) (B), I.R.C. will not cause partnership liabilities
incurred or assumed prior to the termination to be treated as
incurred or assumed on the date of termination. Reg. §1.752-
5(c).
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F. Secs. 1361(b) (1)(D), (c) (4) and (c) (5). I.R.C.
(S Corporation Single Class of Stock).
1. Promulcration -- On May 28, 1992, new Regulations
were finalized with regard to the single class of stock rule as
to S corporations.
2. In General -- The Regulations specifically address
the effect of disproportionate distributions, restricted stock
and stock options.
a. As to disproportionate distributions, the
Regulations provide that a second class of stock results only if
the stockholders have different distribution or liquidation
rights under the terms of the relevant corporate documents, such
as the charter, bylaws, applicable state law or other legally
binding agreements relating to dividends and liquidation rights.
Regs. S§1.1361-1(1)(1) and (2).
b. Generally, employees holding restricted stock
(within the meaning of Reg. S1.83-3(b)) will not be treated as
stockholders until the restrictions lapse and their ownership
rights in the stock fully vest. Prop. Reg. S1.1361-1(b) (3).
This is not the case if the holder of the restricted stock made a
Sec. 83(b) election with respect thereto.
c. A stock option is treated as a second class
of stock if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances,
such option is "substantially certain" to be exercised and has a
strike price "substantially below" the fair market value of the
underlying stock on the date the option is issued and on any
later transfer or material modification thereof. Reg. S1.1361-
I(I) (4) (iii).
d. A convertible debt instrument is considered a
second class of stock if
(1) it is treated as equity under general
principles of Federal tax law relating to debt vs. equity, or
(2) it embodies rights equivalent to a stock
option that is "substantially certain" to be exercised and has a
strike price "substantially below" the fair market value of the
underlying stock on the date of issue or on any later transfer or
material modification thereof. Reg. S1.1361-1(l) (4) (iv).
3. Debt Safe Harbors --
a. Unwritten advances will be considered debt
and not a second class of stock, even if considered equity under
general principles of Federal tax law, if such debt (1) does not
exceed $10,000 per shareholder in the aggregate at any time, (2)
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is treated as debt by the parties and (3) is expected to be
repaid within a reasonable time. Reg. §1.1361-1(1) (4) (ii) (B) (1).
b. Obligations of the same class held
proportionately with the outstanding stock of the corporation are
not treated as a second class of stock, even if considered equity
under general principles of Federal tax law. Reg. S1.1361-1I(1) (4) (i i) (B) (2) .
c. Straight debt is not treated as a second
class of stock under any circumstances. Reg. Si.1361-i(i) (5)(i).
(1) Straight debt means a written
unconditional obligation (whether or not in a formal note), to
pay a sum certain on demand, or on a specified due date, which
(a) does not provide for an interest
rate or payment dates that are contingent on profits, the
borrower's discretion, or similar factors;
(b) is not convertible (directly or
indirectly) into stock or any other equity interest of the S
corporation; and
(c) is held by an individual (other
than a nonresident alien), an estate or a trust qualifying under
Sec. 1361(c)(2), I.R.C.
(2) The fact that an obligation is
subordinated to other debt of the corporation does not prevent it
from qualifying as straight debt. Reg. S1.1361-i(l)(5) (ii).
(3) A material modification or a transfer to
a third party who is not an eligible S corporation shareholder
causes the straight debt to lose its qualification as such. Reg.§1.1361-1(1) (5) (iii).
4. Effective Date -- These Regulations generally
apply to taxable years of a corporation beginning on or after May
28, 1992. However, the corporation and its shareholders may
elect to apply the Regulations to prior taxable years.
G. Sec. 1362(d) (3), I.R.C. (S Corporation Status
Termination for Excess Passive Investment Income).
1. Promulgation -- On April 17, 1992, the Proposed
Regulations relating to passive investment income were revised.
2. In General -- Prop. Reg. §1.1362-3(d)(5) defines
passive investment income as gross receipts derived from
royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities and gains from
the sales or exchanges of stock or securities.
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3. Exceptions -- The following are excluded from the
passive investment income umbrella:
a. Royalties derived in the ordinary course of a
trade or business of licensing property. This exception applies,
however, only if the corporation either (i) created the property
or (ii) performed significant services or incurred substantial
costs with respect to the development or marketing of the
property. Prop. Reg. §1.1362-3(d)(5)(ii) (A)(2).
b. Rents where the corporation also provides
significant services to the user or occupant for the payments.
Prop. Reg. §1.1362-3(d) (5) (ii) (B) (2).
(1) Examples include payments for rooms or
other quarters in hotels, boarding houses, apartment houses,
tourist homes, motor courts or motels if significant services are
rendered.
(2) Significant services are generally
considered rendered to the occupant if they are primarily for the
occupant's convenience and are other than those usually or
customarily rendered in connection with the rental of rooms or
other space for occupancy only.
(3) Maid service is considered an example of
significant services. However, the cleaning of common areas, the
collection of trash and similar activities are not.
(4) Payments for the parking of automobiles
ordinarily are not rents.
c. Interest on obligations acquired from the
sale of property described in Sec. 1221(1), I.R.C. ("dealer"
property) or the performance of services in the ordinary course
of a trade or business of selling the property or performing the
services.
d. Gross receipts directly derived in the
ordinary course of a trade or business of (i) lending or
financing, (ii) dealing in property, (iii) purchasing or
discounting accounts receivable, notes or installment
obligations, or (iv) servicing mortgages. Gain (as well as
interest income) with respect to loans originated in a lending
business, or interest income (as well as gains) from debt
obligations of a dealer in such obligations, constitute gross
receipts directly derived in the ordinary course of business.
4. Effective Date - These rules apply to taxable
years of S corporations beginning after December 31, 1992.
However, for taxable years as to which the statute of limitations
has not expired, the S corporation and its shareholders may elect
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to apply these Proposed Regulations for S corporation taxable
years beginning on or before December 31, 1992, but not for
taxable years beginning on or before December 31, 1981.
III. REVENUE PROCEDURES
A. Rev. Proc. 92-12 (Guidelines for Determining
Deductibility of Points).
1. In Rev. Proc. 92-12, 1992-3 I.R.B. 27, the Service
set forth its new guidelines for determining when points paid on
the financing of a principal residence will be deductible. These
guidelines are applicable to tax years beginning after 1990 and
are intended to minimize possible disputes over the current
deductibility of points. The Service announced that it will
treat as deductible points any amounts paid by a cash basis
taxpayer during the taxable year in cases where all of the
following five requirements are satisfied:
a. The Uniform Settlement Statement with respect
to the property must clearly designate the amounts paid as points
incurred in connection with the indebtedness (example: "loan
origination fee", "loan discount", "discount points" or
"points"). [In Rev. Proc. 92-12A, 1992-26 I.R.B. 20, the Service
clarified that amounts so designated on Va and FHA loans qualify
under the safe harbor, and stated that Rev. Rul. 67-297, 1967-2
C.B. 87, which provides that VA and FHA loan points are
nondeductible service charges, will not apply to cash-method
taxpayers who meet the safe harbor requirements under Rev. Proc.
92-12A.]
b. The amounts must be computed as a percentage
of the stated principal amount of the indebtedness incurred by
the taxpayer.
c. The amounts paid must conform to an
established business practice of charging points for loans for
the acquisition of personal residences in the area in which the
residence is located, and the points paid must not exceed the
amount generally charged in that area; however, if amounts
designated as points are paid in lieu of amounts ordinarily
stated separately on the settlement statement, those amounts are
not deductible as points.
d. The amounts must be paid in connection with
the acquisition of the taxpayer's principal residence and the
loan must be secured by that residence.
e. The amounts paid as points must be paid
directly by the taxpayer claiming the deduction.
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2. Rev. Proc. 92-12 is made specifically inapplicable
to the following amounts, which are thus nondeductible:
a. Points paid in connection with the
acquisition of a principal residence to the extent that such
points are allocable to an amount of loan principal in excess of
the aggregate amount that may be treated as "acquisition
indebtedness" (currently $1 million).
b. Points paid for loans, the proceeds of which
are to be used for improvement, rather than acquisition, of a
principal residence (the deductibility of which remains governed
by Sec. 461(g) (2), I.R.C.).
c. Points paid for loans to purchase or improve
a residence that is not the taxpayer's principal residence.
d. Points paid in connection with a refinancing
loan, a home equity loan or a line of credit, even though the
indebtedness is secured by a principal residence.
(1) Such amounts generally are not
deductible in the year paid and must be amortized over the term
of the loan. See Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146. It should be
noted, however, that any points not deducted, and so remaining at
the time of refinancing of a loan become deductible on the pay-
off of that refinanced loan.
(2) Notwithstanding the general rule, the
Eighth Circuit has held that points paid by a taxpayer in
obtaining a permanent mortgage are deductible immediately. See
Huntsman v. Comm'r, 905 F.2d 181 (1990), rev'g 91 T.C. 917
(1988). This result was reached by reliance on the "in
connection with" language of Sec. 461(g)(2), I.R.C. The Service
has stated that it will not follow Huntsman in Circuits other
than the Eighth Circuit. AOD 1991-02.
e. Under Rev. Proc. 92-12A, points paid by the
seller of a principal residence to or on behalf of the purchaser.
However, where the seller makes any payment to or on behalf of
the purchaser, and the parties do not expressly allocate the
payment to points, the payment will be allocated, to the extent
possible, to expenses other than points.
B. Rev. Proc. 92-20 (Change in Method of Accounting).
Rev. Proc. 84-74 has been superseded by Rev. Proc. 92-
20, 1992-12 I.R.B. 10, which will generally be effective for all
Applications for Change in Accounting Method (on Form 3115) filed
after March 22, 1992. Under the new Revenue Procedure, if a
taxpayer waits until-being contacted by the Internal Revenue
Service as to examination before changing from an impermissible
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method of accounting, the terms of a voluntary change are less
favorable than before, thus providing an added incentive for
voluntary change before such contact.
(1) Change from Category A Accounting Method. If
a taxpayer has not been contacted, the spread-forward period for
positive adjustments will continue to be up to 3 years, beginning
with the year of change, as under Rev. Proc. 84-74. If contact
has been made and for a period of 90 days thereafter, the spread
forward period remains up to 3 years, but begins with the
earliest tax year under examination.
(2) Change from Category B Accounting Method. If
a taxpayer has not been contacted, the spread-forward period for
positive adjustments is up to 6 years, beginning with the year of
change. If a change is made after contact but before the
expiration of the 90-day window, any positive adjustment must be
bunched into the year of change.
Any change in accounting method after the expiration of the
90-day window is considered imposed as part of the examination.
A taxpayer subject to such a change after the expiration of the
90-day window generally has no right to claim the benefit of any
spread-forward; accordingly, the entire amount of any positive
adjustment may be bunched into the earliest tax year under
examination.
C. Rev. Proc. 92-29 (Use of Alternative Cost Method under
Sec. 461(h)).
Rev. Proc. 75-25 provided procedures for allowing real
estate subdividers to add to the basis of property the estimated
cost of future improvements for purposes of determining gain or
loss on a sale. The Service indicated in Notice 91-4 that those
procedures would remain in effect until the issuance of further
rules under Sec. 461(h), I.R.C. In order to address the special
circumstances of real estate developers, the Service issued Rev.
Proc. 92-29.
Under Rev. Proc. 92-29, 1992-17 I.R.B. 15, a developer
may request consent to include in the basis of property sold the
allocable share of the estimated cost of common improvements,
without regard to whether the costs are incurred under Sec.
461(h). The "estimated cost of common improvements" as of the
end of any taxable year is equal to the amount incurred under
Sec. 461(h) as of the end of the taxable year, plus the amount of
common improvement costs the developer reasonably anticipates it
will incur under Sec. 461(h) during the 10 succeeding taxable
years.
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The alternative cost method prescribed by Rev. Proc.
92-29 is subject to a limitation. As of the end of any taxable
year, the total amount of common improvement costs included in
the basis of properties sold may not exceed the amount of common
improvement costs that have been incurred by the developer with
respect to the project under Sec. 461(h). In the event that this
limitation precludes the inclusion of the entire allocable share
of costs to properties sold, the excluded costs may be taken into
account in a subsequent taxable year to the extent that
additional common improvement costs have been incurred under Sec.
461(h).
The developer must satisfy the following conditions in
order to obtain consent to use the alternative cost method:
(1) The developer must be contractually or
legally obligated to provide the common improvements, and the
cost of such improvements must not be recoverable by the
developer through depreciation;
(2) The developer must file a request to use the
alternative cost method on a project-by-project basis;
(3) The developer must sign a consent extending
the limitations period for assessment of income tax with respect
to the use of the-alternate cost method on a project-by-project
basis;
(4) The developer must file an annual statement
for each project for which permission to use the alternative cost
method has been granted; and
(5) The developer must file a supplemental
request for each project for which the developer has received
permission to use the alternative cost method.
D. Rev. Proc. 92-33 (Free Transferability of Interests).
In Rev. Proc. 92-33, 1992-17 I.R.B. 28, supplementing Rev. Proc.
89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, the Service stated that free
transferability of interests will be found not to exist, under
Reg. S301.7701-2(e), if, throughout the life of the partnership,
the limited partnership agreement expressly restricts the
transferability of partnership interests representing more than
20 percent of all interests in partnership capital, income, gain,
losses, deductions and credits.
E. Rev. Proc. 92-35 (Continuity of Life).
The Service stated in Rev. Proc. 92-35, 1992-18 I.R.B.
21, that, if the bankruptcy or removal of a general partner of a
limited partnership causes a dissolution of the partnership
unless the remaining general partners or at least a majority in
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interest of all remaining partners agree to continuation, the
Service will not take the position that the limited partnership
has the corporate characteristic of continuity of life.
This statement should be compared to the position taken
by the Service in Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798. That
Revenue Procedure provided that the Service would not rule that a
limited partnership lacks continuity of life if the partnership
agreement permitted less than a majority in interest of limited
partners to elect to continue the partnership.
F. Rev. Proc. 92-85 (Extension of Time to Make an
Election). In Rev. Proc. 92-85, 1992-42 I.R.B. 32 (advance copy
issued October 1, 1992), the Service provides for the automatic
grant of an extension of time to make an election where the due
date of the election is fixed by the Code, Regulations or other
published guidance. An automatic 12-month extension is granted
for certain elections the deadlines for which are set forth in
Regulations or other published guidance, and a six-month
extension is granted for certain elections where the Code itself
requires that the election be made only by the due date of the
return (or of the return including extensions).
Any tax return, statement of election or other form of
filing that must be made to obtain an automatic extension must
provide the following statement at the top thereof: "Filed
Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 92-85".
Only Regulations issued under certain specified Code
Sections are eligible for the automatic extension. These include
Secs. 337, 338, 444, 472, 508, 528, 754, 911 and 2032A(d) (1),
I.R.C.
In addition, the Revenue Procedure provides a two-step
process by which requests for extensions of time are granted for
elections that do not meet the requirements for automatic
extensions. Applications for relief under this Revenue Procedure
will be granted when the taxpayer provides evidence to establish
that the taxpayer acted reasonably and in good faith, and when
the relief granted would not prejudice the interests of the
Service. Regulations issued under Secs. 266, 461(h) and 472,
I.R.C., qualify for the new, easier process.
G. Rev. Proc. 92-87 (No Rulings as to Limited Partnership
Classification). In Rev. Proc. 92-87, 1992-42 I.R.B. 38, the
Service states that it will not ordinarily rule on whether a
limited partnership lacks the corporate characteristics of
limited liability and continuity of life if the limited
partnership (1) is formed pursuant to a state limited partnership
act that the Service has determined in a revenue ruling is a
statute that corresponds to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
and (2) has the characteristics specified by Rev. Proc. 92-88.
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However, where the limited partnership does not fall within the
guidelines under Rev. Proc. 92-88, the Service will generally
consider a ruling request, as to which the requirements are set
forth in Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798.
H. Rev. Proc. 92-88 (Continuity of Life and Limited
Liability). The Service has decided that many of the requests
for rulings which it receives regarding the classification of
limited partnerships as partnerships for Federal tax purposes do
not present a material legal issue needing resolution.
Accordingly, the Service has issued Rev. Proc. 92-88, 1992-42
I.R.B. 39, setting forth guidelines under which a limited
partnership will be treated as lacking the corporate
characteristics of continuity of life and limited liability. A
limited partnership satisfying these guidelines will be treated
as a partnership for Federal tax purposes and does not ordinarily
need to request a classification ruling.
The general requirements generally follow Sections
4.01, 4.02 and 4.03 of Rev. Proc. 89-12. They are as follows:
1. The general partners, taken together, must have at
least a 1 percent interest in each material item of partnership
income, gain, loss, deduction or credit at all times during the
life of the partnership. However, the 1 percent requirement
drops proportionately -- but not below 0.2 percent -- as total
contributions exceed $50 million.
2. The general partners, taken together, must
maintain, at all times, a minimum capital account balance equal
to either 1 percent of the total positive capital account
balances for the partnership or $500,000, whichever is less,
unless no limited partner capital account has a positive balance.
As to continuity of life, a limited partnership is
treated as lacking the same if it is formed under a state limited
partnership act that has been determined in a revenue ruling to
correspond to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Se Rev. Rul.
89-123, 1989-2 C.B. 261 (and any Revenue Rulings that supersede
or amplify the same) for a list of states that have enacted
legislation that corresponds to the ULPA.
As to limited liability, a limited partnership must
satisfy the net worth requirements set forth below on a
continuing basis. (In determining net worth, assets are valued
at their current fair market value.) A limited partnership
cannot rely on Rev. Proc. 92-88 for any period of time subsequent
to the failure to meet the net worth standard.
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1. If the sole general partner is a corporation, its
net worth must equal or exceed 10 percent of the total
contributions to the partnership. (Any interest in the
partnership is not included.) If there are two or more corporate
general partners, the net worth may be met on a collective basis.
2. If the sole general partner is an individual, that
partner's net worth must equal or exceed the lesser of 10 percent
of the total contributions to the partnership or $1,000,000.
(Any interest in the partnership is not included.) If there are
two or more individual general partners, the net worth may be met
on a collective basis.
3. If the general partners include one or more
corporations and one or more individuals, the net worth test may
be met either by the corporation(s) and individual(s), on a
collective basis, meeting the corporate test above or by all the
individual(s) collectively meeting the individual test above.
4. In determining the net worth of the general
partners, the value of property included in determining the net
worth of one general partner may not be taken into account in
determining the net worth of any other general partner. (e.g., a
parent corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary both serving as
general partners of a partnership.)
IV. REVENUE RULINGS
A. Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19. The Service ruled
that a reduction in the unpaid principal amount of a nonrecourse
debt results in the realization of discharge of indebtedness
income by the debtor, irrespective of whether the fair market
value of the property is greater or less than the balance of the
debt at the time of the principal reduction.
The holding in this Ruling amplified Rev. Rul. 82-202,
1982-2 C.B. 35, in which the Service ruled that a reduction in
debt, whether recourse or nonrecourse, results in the realization
of income by the debtor under Sec. 61(a)(12), I.R.C., if, at the
time of the reduction, the fair market value of the property is
greater than the principal balance of the debt.
The Service expressly rejected the holding in Fulton
Gold Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934), in which the Board of
Tax Appeals held that the satisfaction of a nonrecourse mortgage
for an amount less than its face amount results in a reduction of
the mortgagor's basis in the underlying property rather than the
realization of income. See also CommI'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300
(1983); and Gershkowitz v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 984 (1987). But see,
for a variation on Gershkowitz, Newman's Estate v. Comm'r, 934
F.2d 426 (CA2 1991), rev'g 59 TCM 543 (1990).
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B. Rev. Rul. 91-47, 1991-2 C.B. 757. The Service held
that where a person unrelated to a debtor forms or avails of a
corporation to acquire the debtor's debt and shortly thereafter
sells all of the stock of the new corporation to the debtor, the
debtor realizes discharge of indebtedness income under Sec.
61(a) (12), I.R.C. Such income can, however, be excluded under
Sec. 108(a), I.R.C., if (1) the discharge occurs in a title 11
case (Secs. 108(a)(1)(A) and (d)(2), I.R.C.), (2) the debtor is
insolvent both before and after the discharge (to the extent of
the insolvency) (Secs. 108(a) (1) (B) and (3) and (d)(3), I.R.C.),
or (3) the debt is qualified farm indebtedness (Secs.
108(a)(1)(C) and (g), I.R.C.).
In this Ruling, it was specified that the unrelated
party ("P") (1) may or may not have held debt of the debtor
("'D"); (2) learned that D was seeking to reduce its debt; (3)
discussed with D the formation of a corporation to acquire D's
debt and the subsequent sale of the stock of such corporation to
D; (4) anticipated (as did D) that acquiring the debt of D
through such corporation would allow D to avoid the discharge of
indebtedness income that D would have had if D had acquired the
debt itself directly or through a related party; (5) had no
important business purpose for the formation of the new
corporation other than to acquire D's debt; and (6) ordinarily
did not acquire stock or debt through a special-purpose
corporation in making acquisitions on behalf of, or for resale
to, unrelated persons.
The Service, using both step-transaction and form
versus substance (or business purpose) analyses, found that the
substance of the transaction controls to prevent the avoidance of
Secs. 61(a)(12) and 108(e)(4), I.R.C. The Service noted that,
because P's formation of the new corporation to acquire D's debt
did not serve an [otherwise] important business purpose and was
for the primary purpose of avoiding the discharge of indebtedness
income that D would realize if it acquired its debt directly or
through a related party, P's ownership of the new corporation is
disregarded. Accordingly, the transaction entered into by D and
P is treated as though D in fact acquired its debt from P
directly or through a related party.
C. Rev. Rul. 92-2, 1992-3 I.R.B. 5. The purchaser of a
principal residence is often charged points. In cases where the
financing is obtained from a lender through a mortgage broker,
some portion of the amount charged as points may be paid directly
or indirectly to the broker. The Service ruled that all points
received directly or indirectly by a mortgage broker in
connection with the financing of the purchase of a principal
residence are reportable under Section 6050H to the same extent
as if paid to and retained by the lender.
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D. Rev. Rul. 92-17, 1992-12 I.R.B. 5. D corporation was
the general partner of a limited partnership ("LP"), owning a 20
percent interest therein. LP owned, for more than 5 years,
several commercial office buildings that were leased to unrelated
third parties. D owned its interest in LP for more than 5 years.
D also owned, for more than 5 years, all of the stock of C, a
corporation actively engaged for more than 5 years in the conduct
of a trade or business unrelated to D's activities.
As the general partner of LP, D was required to provide
the managerial services necessary to operate the rental business
of LP. LP provided day-to-day upkeep and maintenance services
for the office buildings, advertising for new tenants,
negotiating leases, handling tenant complaints and paying all
expenses. LP also periodically repainted and refurbished its
existing properties. D's officers performed active and
substantial management functions with respect to LP's activities.
In addition, D's officers regularly participated in the overall
supervision, direction and control of LP's employees in their
performance of LP's general functions.
Although D did not itself have employees to perform the
operational services necessary to operate LP's office buildings,
the Service nonetheless found that a spin off of all of the C
stock to D's shareholders met the active conduct of a trade or
business test of Sec. 355(b), I.R.C., and therefore qualified as
a tax-free distribution under Sec. 355, I.R.C. The Service, in
its conclusion, harkened back to its similar conclusion in Rev.
Rul. 79-394, 1979-2 C.B. 141, amplified by Rev. Rul. 80-181,
1980-2 C.B. 121.
E. Rev. Rul. 92-20, 1992-13 I.R.B. 18. A transferred
shares of X, an S corporation, to a trust. The trust instrument
provides that all trust income is to be distributed to B, the
trust beneficiary, on at least an annual basis. It is further
provided, however, that, if the trust no longer holds shares of X
or any other S corporation, the trustee may distribute trust
income or accumulate such income, adding it to the trust corpus.
Any trust income remaining undistributed at the time of B's death
would be paid over to B's estate. The Service ruled that the
provision authorizing accumulation of trust income in the event
that the trust does not hold shares of an S corporation does not,
alone, preclude qualification of the trust as a QSST.
F. Rev. Rul. 92-52, 1992-27 I.R.B. 6. This Revenue Ruling
provides guidance for insolvent corporate taxpayers who provide
cash or other property, as well as stock, to their creditors in
exchange for the cancellation of debt, where the resolution is
outside of a title 11 case.
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In the first situation, X corporation owes an unsecured
debt of $90,000 to an unrelated creditor. X has assets with a
fair market value of $40,000, and so is insolvent in the amount
of $50,000. In 1992, X issues $10,000 of its debt and $20,000 of
its common stock to the creditor in exchange for the $90,000 of
debt. Accordingly, X has $60,000 of discharge of indebtedness.
However, because of the $50,000 of insolvency immediately before
the discharge, X only has $10,000 of COD income. Under the
legislative history of the 1980 Bankruptcy Tax Act (see S.Rep.
No. 1035 at 17, 1980-2 C.B. at 629), where a corporate debtor
issues a package of stock and other property to cancel debt, the
cash and other property are treated, first, as satisfying an
amount of debt equal thereto, with the remainder of the debt
being treated as satisfied by the stock issuance. Accordingly,
under Sec. 108(e) (10), I.R.C., no reduction of the corporation's
tax attributes is required under Secs. 108(a) and 1017, I.R.C.
In the second situation, Y has unsecured debt to A of
$30,000 and to B of $60,000. Both A and B are unrelated to Y.
In 1992, Y issues $10,000 of debt to A in exchange for its debt
to A and common stock with a fair market value of $20,000 to B in
exchange for its debt to B. As to A, Y has $20,000 of discharge
of indebtedness, and as to B, Y has $40,000 of discharge of
indebtedness. However, because of the $50,000 of insolvency
immediately before the discharge, Y only has $10,000 of discharge
of indebtedness income. When determining the potential tax
attribute reduction of an insolvent debtor outside of a title 11
case, the discharge of indebtedness attributable to insolvency is
first allocated to stock-for-debt exchanges, with any remaining
discharge of indebtedness attributable to insolvency allocated to
any other exchanges. Because the stock-for-debt exchange applies
first, so that Sec. 108(e)(10), I.R.C. applies, that $40,000
discharge does not result in any attribute reduction. However,
as to the debt-for-debt exchange, the $10,000 discharge is
governed by Sec. 108(b) and 1017, I.R.C.
G. Rev. Rul. 92-53, 1992-27 I.R.B. 7. The Service holds,
in dealing with three situations in this Ruling, that the amount
by which a nonrecourse debt exceeds the fair market value of the
property securing the debt is taken into account in determining
whether, and to what extent, a taxpayer is insolvent under Sec.
108(d)(3), I.R.C., but only to the extent that the "excess
nonrecourse debt" is discharged.
In all three situations, there was no bankruptcy or
qualified farm indebtedness, so that the specific exclusions of
Secs. 108(a) (1) (A) and (C), I.R.C. do not apply.
In situation 1, individual A borrowed $1,000,000 from C
in 1988 and signed a nonrecourse note for such amount, secured by
an office building with a value in excess of $1,000,000 which A
purchased with the loan proceeds. In 1989, when the building's
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value has fallen to $800,000, C agreed to reduce the note to
$825,000. At that time, A's only other assets had a fair market
value of $100,000, and A was personally liable to D for $50,000.
In situation 2, the facts are the same, except that D
agreed to accept assets from A with a fair market value (and
basis to A) of $40,000 in settlement of A's recourse debt to D of
$50,000, but C did not reduce the nonrecourse debt.
In situation 3, the facts are the same as in situation
1, except that, pursuant to a pre-arranged workout plan, D
accepted the assets of $40,000 in settlement of A's $50,000 debt
and shortly thereafter C reduced the nonrecourse note to
$825,000.
In situation 1, A has $1,025,000 of liabilities,
comprised of (i) the $50,000 of recourse debt, (ii) the $800,000
of nonrecourse debt equal to the fair market value of the
building and (iii) the $175,000 ($1,000,000 less $825,000) of
excess nonrecourse liability discharged. A's $1,025,000 of
liabilities exceed A's assets of $900,000 ($800,000 building plus
$100,000 other assets) by $125,000 immediately before the debt
discharge, and so A is insolvent by such $125,000. Therefore
under Secs. 108(a)(1)(B) and (3), I.R.C., $50,000 of the $175,000
discharged debt ($175,000 less $125,000) is COD income under Sec.
61(a)(12), I.R.C.
In situation 2, only $10,000 of recourse debt, but no
excess nonrecourse debt, is discharged, and so the excess
nonrecourse debt is not taken into account at all in determining
A's insolvency under Sec. 108(d)(3), I.R.C. A is therefore
solvent immediately before the discharge because its liabilities
of $850,000 ($800,000 building debt (limited to building fair
market value) and $50,000 recourse debt) do not exceed its
$900,000 fair market value of assets ($800,000 building and
$100,000 other assets). Thus, the entire $10,000 of discharged
debt is income under Sec. 61(a) (12), I.R.C.
In situation 3, A has $185,000 ($10,000 recourse debt
and $175,000 nonrecourse debt) discharge of indebtedness.
Because of the prearranged plan, the discharges are viewed as
occurring simultaneously, but only for determining whether, and
to what extent, A is insolvent under Sec. 108(d) (3), I.R.C. As a
result, A has $60,000 of COD income under Sec. 61(a) (12), I.R.C.,
determined as set forth under situations 1 and 2.
In Rev. Rul. 92-53, the Service distinguishes Rev. Rul.
91-31, supra, on the basis that Rev. Rul. 91-31 deals with
discharge of indebtedness income under Sec. 61(a) (12), I.R.C.,
but does not address the treatment of nonrecourse indebtedness in
applying the Sec. 108 insolvency exclusion. Does such
distinction hold up under close scrutiny? See Lipton, IRS Adopts
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Inconsistent Positions on Nonrecourse Debt in Loan Workouts, 77
J.Tax. 196 (1992).
H. Rev. Rul. 92-92, 1992-45 I.R.B. . A, an individual
defaults on a recourse loan from an unrelated bank when the
outstanding unpaid balance is $1,000,000. A transfers property
with an adjusted basis of $700,000 and a fair market value of
$800,000 to the bank in full satisfaction of the debt. As a
result, A has $200,000 of COD income ($1,000,000 recourse
liability less $800,000 value of property transferred) and
$100,000 of disposition income ($800,000 value of property less
$700,000 adjusted basis). The COD income is not excluded from
A's income under Sec. 108, I.R.C. At the time of discharge of
indebtedness, under Temp. Reg. S1.163-8T, dealing with debt
tracing, 60 percent of the debt is allocated to passive activity
expenditures and 40 percent is allocated to other expenditures.
As noted by the Service, "it is generally appropriate
to allocate the income in the manner in which Section 1.163-8T of
the temporary regulations allocates the debt at the time of the
discharge and to treat the income allocated to an expenditure as
income from the activity to which the expenditure relates.
However, traditional substance over form and step transaction
principles will apply to prevent taxpayers from attempting to
manipulate the character of COD income."
V. PRIVATE LETTER RULINGS
A. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9125010 (March 19, 1991). An
individual taxpayer, X, proposed to enter a transaction pursuant
to which one of X's creditors would, in exchange for a cash
payment, discharge X's liability to it. X was not in a title 11
proceeding. X inquired as to whether the value of his personal
residence and other property exempt under state law from the
grasp of creditors would be disregarded in determining the
taxpayer's "insolvency" for purposes of the exception under Secs.
108(a) (1) (B) and (3) and (d)(3), I.R.C.
The Service held that the taxpayer's personal residence
and other property exempt from creditors under state law should
be disregarded in the determination, of the extent to which the
taxpayer was insolvent. See Marcus' Estate v. Comm'r, 34 TCM 38
(1975), and Hunt v. Comm'r, 57 TCM 919 (1989). See also Dallas
Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 70 F.2d 95 (CA5
1934), and Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937).
B. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9128024 (April 12, 1991). Apartment
buildings which decedent owned directly (in whole or in part) or
indirectly (through corporations or a general partnership) were
found by the Service to constitute interests in a closely held
business under Sec. 6166(b), I.R.C.
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The Service noted that decedent's activities (assisted
by his son, a handyman and a garbage remover, all of whom could
be viewed as agents of decedent) went beyond merely collecting
rents, making mortgage payments and making necessary repairs,
which are considered investment management. The day-to-day
operations and management were handled by decedent, who directly
or through his agents, did everything from interviewing and
screening prospective tenants, to negotiating leases, to
maintaining all common areas, to painting, to paying bills, to
inspecting buildings, to resolving complaints from tenants and
mediating tenant disputes.
The Service further noted that decedent was on call 24
hours a day (including weekends) for emergencies or urgent
repairs, and that decedent had no source of earned income other
than from the management of the real estate interests.
C. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9146043 (AuQust 20, 1991). Corporation
X and wholly owned subsidiary Z engaged in the active conduct of
a trade or business involving the rental of commercial office,
warehouse and parking space. The shares of X were owned equally
by A and B. To eliminate problems generated by disputes between
A and B, X proposed to distribute its Z stock to B in exchange
for B's X stock. After the proposed transaction, A would own all
of the X stock and B would own all of the Z stock. The Service
held that, under the facts presented, no gain or loss should be
recognized by X upon distribution, or by B upon receipt, of Y
stock. After the contemplated distribution, the basis of the Y
stock in B's hands will be the same as the basis of the
surrendered X stock and tacking will apply in determining the
holding period for the stock.
D. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9148013 (August 23, 1991). The
taxpayer, an S corporation, owns, installs and leases trailers
and relocatable modular offices for use at construction sites.
In connection with such leasing transactions, the corporation
remodels the units to customer specifications, provides
assistance in the installation and set-up of such units, and
services, maintains and repairs the units during the lease term.
The corporation also leases and services portable toilets,
temporary power poles and construction sheds.
The income generated by leasing activities is generally
characterized as "rents". The Service recognized, however, that
income from leasing personal property which is delivered and
maintained by the owners does not constitute "rents" for the
purpose of characterization of such income as passive investment
income. Accordingly, the Service ruled that the income realized
by the corporation from such leasing activities does not
constitute disqualifying "passive investment income" which would
result in the termination of an S election.
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E. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9148025 (AuQust 26. 1991). Taxpayer
transferred all assets of a mobile home park, except for the
underlying land, to a wholly owned corporation. The corporation
leased the land from taxpayer. In connection with the operation
of a nearby airport, the city claimed a navigation easement over
the land. The city refused to condemn the property, electing
instead to impose restrictive covenants upon the property. The
property was then returned to the taxpayer, subject to the
imposed restrictive covenants which made the land uninhabitable.
The Service held that the proceeds from a subsequent
sale of the land would constitute proceeds from an involuntary
conversion and that any new land acquired by the taxpayer and
improved for purposes of use as a mobile home park would
constitute qualified replacement property under Section 1033.
The taxpayer was found to be entitled to the benefits of Section
1033, notwithstanding the fact that the city refused to acquire
the property, but instead imposed restrictions on its use which
were incompatible with taxpayer's use of the property, which had
continued for a period in excess of 30 years. Section 1033 was
ruled to be applicable in this case even though the taxpayer
retained title to the property and the subsequent sale was to
private parties.
F. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9149009 (Auciust 29, 1991). Taxpayer
purchased lessee's interest in a safe harbor lease agreement,
taking property subject to the lease. Taxpayer then leased the
property to the lessee, with such leasing activity being the sole
activity of taxpayer. The Service agreed with the taxpayer that
such leasing activity is a passive activity within the meaning of
Sec. 469(c), I.R.C. Accordingly, the Service concluded that the
items of income and deduction associated with the safe harbor
lease are to be taken into account for purposes of determining
taxpayer's passive activity loss, if any, for the taxable year.
The Service ruled that taxpayer's deductions for rent expense and
leasehold amortization under the safe harbor lease may be
recognized as passive deductions. The Service further ruled that
all interest income realized by taxpayer on an installment note
given under the safe harbor lease must be recognized as portfolio
income.
G. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9149018 (September 4. 1991).
Corporation X owns an office building which has a fair market
value in excess of its adjusted basis. X plans to transfer the
building only in an exchange transaction in which X-will
designate property upon which a new building will be constructed,
followed by an exchange of the existing building for the newly
constructed building. The existing building is used by X in its
business, and it will acquire the new building, along with the
lease agreement, to be used in such business. The rights of X to
participate in the development and construction of the building
are extensive. (The Service found this to be acceptable, citing
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J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 608 (1962).)
Furthermore, X is furnishing the financing, on a nonrecourse
basis, to construct the project. (The Service approved this
technique, under the authority of 124 Front Street, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 65 T.C. 6 (1975).) Because the lease will have a
remaining term of 30 years or more at the time of the exchange,
it qualifies for like-kind exchange treatment under Reg.
§1. 1031 (a) -1 (c) (2).
H. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9213001 (November 27, 1991). X is an S
corporation formed to market and sell weekly timeshare
condominium units in a certain geographic area. In 1986, X
purchased two non-contiguous condominium projects. During 1986
and 1987, X converted, marketed and sold these residences as
resort timeshare units on a fee simple, week-interval ownership
basis. The purchaser made a small downpayment at the time of
sale, with the balance payable in monthly installments. X
reported its income from sales of one project on the installment
method, and of the other project on an accrual method. The
Service found that, under Secs. 446(c) and 453(d) (1), I.R.C., the
taxpayer was not required to report all sales under the
installment method. The Service further found that, under Sec.
453C, I.R.C., the sales from February 28, 1986 through December
31, 1987 were applicable installment obligations as to which an
election to be taxed on the installment method had not properly
been made. Accordingly, any deferred gain at January 1, 1988 had
to be recognized by X in two equal annual amounts, in each of
1988 and 1989.
I. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9217010 (January 13, 1992). Taxpayer
entered into four separate agreements with four different owners
to purchase land parcels B, C, D and E. Prior to the closing
date for all four purchases, the taxpayer entered into a new
purchase and sale agreement to sell the four parcels to a joint
venture, organized for the purpose of purchasing and developing
the four parcels. The selling price to the joint venture was
subject to adjustment in case a certain number of condominium
units were not approved by the appropriate governmental entities.
After the purchase and sale agreement with the joint venture was
executed, the taxpayer entered into negotiations with the joint
venture to repurchase the four parcels, with plans to sell the
four parcels to a third party. Thereafter, the joint venture
acquired title to the four parcels and held them for about 120
days, at which time the joint venture transferred title to the
taxpayer, which itself developed the property.
The taxpayer reported the entire transaction as a
financing transaction, rather than a sale and repurchase of
property. The Service stated that "the key to deciding whether
Taxpayer's transactions with Joint Venture were a sale and
repurchase or a loan is to determine whether the benefits and
burdens of ownership passed from Taxpayer to Joint Venture during
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the 120-day period that Joint Venture held title to the four
parcels." Citing Grodt & McKay Realty. Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.
1221 (1981), the Service considered eight factors, as follows:
(1) whether legal title to the property passes; (2) how the
parties treated the transaction; (3) whether equity was acquired
in the property; (4) whether the agreement created an obligation
on the seller to execute and deliver a deed and an obligation on
the purchaser to make payments; (5) whether the right of
possession was vested in the purchaser; (6) which party paid the
property taxes; (7) which party bore the risk of loss or damage
to the property; and (8) which party received the profits from
the sale of the property. Based on such factors, the Service
found that the joint venture was not a financier for the
taxpayer, but rather that there was a true sale and repurchase of
the property.
J. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9218078 (January 31, 1992). A limited
liability company organized under the Texas Limited Liability
Company Act was classified as a partnership for Federal income
tax purposes. Because the LLC would dissolve on the death,
retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy or dissolution of
one of its members, unless the remaining members (all or such
lesser number as stated in the articles of organization or
regulations of the LLC) consented to continue the organization,
the LLC lacked continuity of life. Further, because no
transferee had the right to become a substituted member unless
consent was given by the manager (who had to be a member of the
LLC) or members owning at least two-thirds of the outstanding
units (excluding the transferred unit), which consent could be
withheld in the discretion of the manager or the members, the LLC
lacked free transferability of interests.
K. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9224006 (March 5, 1992). T owns 99
percent of the capital and profit interests of B, 79.7% of P and
98.75% of C. T, B, P and C are all limited partnerships. On
July 3, 1989, B acquired a 5.5 acre tract of real property to be
held for investment and future development and for operating a
surface parking lot on the property. The tract was sold to the
county under the threat or imminence of condemnation. B proposes
to acquire tracts of improved and unimproved real property from P
and C as replacements for the tract sold to the county. The
replacement tracts will be acquired at their fair market values,
as determined by an independent appraiser; will be held for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment; and will
be of a like-kind with respect to the tract sold to the county.
The replacement tracts will be acquired within three years of the
sale to the county, as required by Sec. 1033(g)(1), I.R.C.
Citing Rev. Rul. 73-120, 1973-1 C.B. 369, involving an apartment
complex purchased by an S corporation from its shareholders in an
arm's-length transaction, the Service found that, so long as an
arm's-length purchase price is paid for the replacement tracts,
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the transaction will qualify under Secs. 1033(a) (2) (A) and
1033(g), I.R.C.
L. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9224025 (March 13, 1992). P will be
organized as a limited partnership under the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act of State N. X, an S corporation also
formed in State N, will be the sole general partner of P. The
sole shareholders of X are A and B, who are sister and brother.
The limited partners of P will be A, B and Y, a State N
corporation, the shares of which are directly and indirectly
owned by a family that includes A, B, the mother of A and B, and
trusts for the benefit of the children of A and B. Because P
will be organized under a statute corresponding to the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, P will lack of continuity of life.
Because the limited partnership agreement of P provides that all
partners must approve an assignee of a limited partnership being
admitted as a substituted limited partner, there is no free
transferability of interests. Accordingly, P will be classified
as a partnership for Federal income tax purposes.
M. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9226035 (March 26, 1992). The Service
found that the conversion of a general partnership into a limited
liability company could take place generally without adverse
Federal income tax consequences. The conversion is to be
effected by a contribution of the interests of the members of the
general partnership to the LLC in exchange for all of the
ownership interests in the LLC, followed by a dissolution of the
general partnership and distribution of all of its assets to the
LLC, which will assume all of the recourse obligations and take
subject to all of the nonrecourse obligations of the general
partnership. The LLC will be classified as a partnership for
Federal income tax purposes because it will lack the
characteristics of free transferability of interests and
continuity of life.
Citing Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157, the Service
found that (1) under Sec. 721, I.R.C. no gain or loss will be
recognized by the members, the general partnership or the LLC on
the transfer of the interests in the general partnership to the
LLC or the liquidation of the general partnership, except as
provided in Sec. 752, I.R.C.; and (2) the LLC will be considered
a continuation of the general partnership, and so the conversion
of the general partnership into the LLC will not be considered a
sale or exchange (under Reg. §1.708-1(b)(1) (ii)) and will not
result in a termination of the general partnership under Sec.
708, I.R.C.
N. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9238005 (June 8, 1992). Prior to June
22, 1981, Y was a corporation wholly owned by corporation X; X
was a corporation wholly owned by individual A; and W was a
corporation wholly owned by A's daughter ("D") and two trusts
("trusts") created for the benefit of A's two granddaughters. On
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June 22, 1981, X sold to W all of the Y stock in consideration
for a 20-year promissory note (the "Note"). The Note was
collateralized by a security agreement between X and W, pursuant
to which X received a security interest in all the Y stock and
all the stock in two wholly owned subsidiaries of Y, and these
shares were deposited with X. On June 25, 1982, X distributed
all of its assets (including the Note) to A pursuant to a plan of
complete liquidation under Sec. 337, I.R.C. 1954. In 1982 and
1983, W made its annual payments on the Note to A. On March 15,
1983, W, Y and Y's two subsidiaries adopted plans for complete
liquidation under Sec. 337, and Y sold most of its assets and the
assets of its two subsidiaries for cash and the assumption of
certain liabilities. On March 15, 1984, Y and its two
subsidiaries distributed all their assets (primarily cash) and
liabilities to W, which, in turn, distributed all of its assets
and liabilities to D and the Trusts, all pursuant to the plans of
complete liquidation.
The sale and complete liquidations changed A's
collateral for the Note from the shares of stock of Y and its two
subsidiaries to cash, publicly traded stocks and bonds and real
estate. Moreover, the obligor in the Note was changed from W to
D and the Trusts. Citing Rev. Rul. 55-5, 1955-1 C.B. 331, the
Service found that the substitution of collateral securing an
installment obligation does not constitute a disposition under
Sec. 453B(a), I.R.C. Citing Cunningham v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 103
(1965), and Rev. Rul. 75-457, 1975-2 C.B. 196, amplified by Rev.
Rul. 82-122, 1982-1 C.B. 80, the Service found that the
substitution of a new obligor on the Note likewise did not
constitute a disposition.
However, under Temp. Reg. S15a.453-1(b) (3) (i), the
Service held that the portion of the collateral consisting of
cash or equivalents was considered a payment on the Note, causing
recognition of any gain inherent in that payment.
0. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9238034 (June 23, 1992). X, an S
corporation with 35 shareholders, has two businesses. One is the
provision of management, payroll, billing and collection services
to health care providers. The second is a facility at which
outpatient surgery is performed. The shareholders want to expand
the surgery center; they need additional capital for the
expansion, and are willing to offer an equity position in the
expanded facility to new investors. However, the shareholders do
not want to share with new investors the other, distinct business
of X. They think that business has real potential for growth on
its own and should be retained by the original risk takers.
X proposes to form a limited partnership ("LP") to own
and operate the surgery center. X will contribute to LP the
assets of its surgery center business, including trade
receivables, a share of fixed assets and debt, in exchange for a
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general partner interest. Limited partner investments in LP will
be offered to potential investors. X will have a percent
interest in the profits of LP, and the investors will have the
remainder. X will provide LP with management, personnel,
payroll, billing and collection services.
The Service held that ownership of an interest in the
partnership would not preclude X from maintaining its S
corporation status. The Service relied on Rev. Rul. 71-455,
1971-2 C.B. 318, and Patterson v. Comm'r, 47 TCM 1029 (1984).
The Service also found that, in contradistinction to Rev. Rul.
77-220, 1977-1 C.B. 263, this was not a ploy to circumvent the 35
shareholder limitation of Sec. 1361(b)(1) (A), I.R.C., because of
the valid business purpose for the proposed transaction.
P. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9239014 (June 25, 1992). Mr. and Mrs.
A, husband and wife, propose to form a limited partnership and
place their business into it. The business is currently operated
by Mr. and Mrs. A, and all of its assets are either in their
separate names or held by them as joint tenants. The general
partner will be a corporation, all of the stock of which is owned
by Mr. A. The general partner will have a one percent interest
in the partnership, and Mr. and Mrs. A will be the sole limited
partners, each owning a 49.5 percent interest. The Service found
that the limited partnership will be classified as a partnership
for Federal income tax purposes because it will lack the
corporate characteristics of continuity of life and free
transferability of interest. As to free transferability, no
limited partner may, under the partnership agreement, transfer
any portion of his or her limited partner interest in any manner
that results in the transferee becoming a substitute limited
partner without the prior written consent of the general partner.
Q. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9240004 (June 29, 1992). Taxpayer is a
corporation engaged in the manufacturing and sale of a product.
Taxpayer operates a facility in State N which contains equipment
used in the processing and manufacturing of such product. The
equipment, which was manufactured prior to the 1980s, is
insulated with asbestos. Both State N and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration set standards, affecting the
taxpayer, for concentrations of airborne asbestos fiber allowable
in the work place. In response thereto, and in order to afford
its workers the necessary health and safety protection, taxpayer
decided to remove the asbestos insulation from its equipment in
the State N facility and replace it with alternative insulating
materials.
The taxpayer has stated that the new replacement
insulation is about 10 percent less thermally efficient than the
asbestos insulation, and thus does not save energy or effect
other operating efficiencies, other than health and safety. In
addition, the total cost of removal, although significant, is
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minor in relation to the facility's overall repair and
maintenance costs and in relation to the assessed value of the
equipment for property tax purposes. Consequently, the taxpayer
has currently deducted the costs incurred to remove asbestos
insulation and to install new insulating materials into its
manufacturing equipment.
The Service found that the taxpayer must capitalize its
asbestos costs under Sec. 263, I.R.C. (for taxable years
beginning prior to January 1, 1987) or Sec. 263A, I.R.C. (for
taxable years beginning after December 21, 1986). The Service
noted that "the costs incurred by the taxpayer for removal and
replacement of asbestos-containing insulation are not similar to
incidental repairs. Rather, these costs are more in the nature
of capital expenditures because, by reducing or eliminating the
human health risks posed by the presence of asbestos, these
expenditures increase the value of the taxpayer's equipment.
Specifically, the taxpayer's risk of liability to contaminated
employees is decreased. Moreover, asbestos removal makes the
taxpayer's property more marketable. Generally, property without
asbestos is more attractive to potential buyers, investors, and
lenders. In fact, the lending policies of several financial
institutions favor, and sometimes require, asbestos removal. * *
* Thus, property from which asbestos has been removed and
replaced is inherently more valuable than property that contains
asbestos insulation."
The Service cited, among other cases, INDOPCO. Inc. v.
Comm'r, 112 S.Ct. 1039, 92-2 USTC 50,113 (1992), where, the
Service stated, the "Court noted that, in determining whether an
expenditure is capital in nature, an important consideration is
whether the taxpayer realizes benefits beyond the year in which
the expenditure is incurred." The Service pointed out that, in
its view, "the taxpayer's asbestos removal costs create long-term
future benefits that accrue beyond the year that they were
incurred. In addition, these future benefits are not merely
incidental. In fact, they relate to the very reason for
incurring the expense [ -- ] increased health and safety."
VI. CASES
A. Aizawa v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. , No. 10 (1992). The
taxpayers owned rental property which they purchased in 1981 for
$120,000 plus $433 in closing costs, giving the sellers a $90,000
interest-only recourse mortgage rate at closing. The entire
unpaid principal balance of the note was due in full in June
1985, but the taxpayers did not pay it. In 1987, the sellers
obtained a $133,506.91 judgment against the taxpayers, consisting
of the $90,000 unpaid principal, $18,000 accrued but unpaid
interest, $25,000 legal fees and $500 court costs. Later in
1987, the sellers purchased the property at a foreclosure sale
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for $72,000, leaving an unsatisfied deficiency judgment of
$66,806.71.
The taxpayers claimed a loss of $70,898.29 on their
1987 tax return, determined by subtracting the amount of
$29,193.09 from their basis at the time of foreclosure of
$100,091.38. The amount of $29,193.09 was derived by subtracting
the $60,806.91 deficiency judgment from the $90,000 unpaid
principal. The Revenue Service countered, in turn, that the
taxpayers had a loss of only $10,091.38, derived by subtracting
the $90,000 unpaid principal from the $100,091.38 basis of the
taxpayers.
The Court rejected both approaches. Noting that this
was the first time that a court had confronted this issue
directly, the Court found that the "key to the resolution of the
issue" was "in the recognition that, in this case, there is a
clear separation between the foreclosure sale and the unpaid
recourse liability for mortgage principal which survives as part
of a deficiency judgment." Accordingly, the Court held that the
taxpayers had a loss of $27,391.38, determined by subtracting the
foreclosure sale price of $72,000 (the "amount realized" under
Sec. 1001(a), I.R.C.) from the taxpayers' $100,091.38 basis at
that time.
The Court went on to say that nothing in Comm'r v.
Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983), rejects the use of the foreclosure
sale proceeds, which represents the fair market value of the
property at that time, as the amount realized. Although the
language of Tufts suggests that the fair market value is
irrelevant where the value is less than the amount of the unpaid
mortgage principal, the Court stated that such language was
directed to the situation where that mortgage obligation was
discharged -- a situation not present here.
B. Berg's Estate v. Comm'r, 61 TCM 2949 (1991). The
taxpayer included on the estate tax return shares of stock in a
closely held real estate holding company. The Court stated that
the valuation of stock in a closely held corporation for estate
tax purposes must take into account all relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular corporation at issue. The Court
found that the proper valuation of such interests may include
both minority and lack of marketability discounts. A minority
discount is recognized because the holder of a minority interest
lacks control over corporate policy, cannot direct the payment of
dividends, and cannot compel the liquidation of corporate assets.
A lack of marketability discount reflects the fact that there is
no ready market for shares in a closely held corporation.
C. Callahan v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 276 (1992). The taxpayers
were limited partners in JEC Options, an Illinois limited
partnership. They were required, if called upon by the general
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partners, to pay three times the amount of their cash
contributions. However, the limited partners had the discretion,
by notice in writing, to opt out of the overcall provision. The
taxpayers argued, under Pritchett v. Comm'r, 827 F.2d 644 (CA9
1987), that they were at risk for three times their capital
contributions. The I.R.S. answered that the limited partners
were not at risk for amounts in excess of their initial cash
contributions because the obligation to make additional
contributions under the overcall provision was contingent and
illusory. The Court agreed with the Service.
D. Campbell v. Comm'r, 943 F.2d 815 (CA8 1991), rev'g 59
TCM 236 (1990). The taxpayer received "special limited partner"
interests in 3 separate limited partnerships in which its
corporate employer (or one of its affiliates) was the general
partner and investors were Class A limited partners. Based on
projections when received, cash flow was unlikely for a number of
years, but tax losses were allocated to taxpayer right away in
each partnership. The taxpayer argued, first, that he had
received his partnership interest for services to be rendered to
the partnerships, and so, under Sec. 721, had no income; second,
that the partnership interests, if property, were so restricted
that they were not "transferred" to the taxpayer under Sec. 83,
or, if transferred, were subject to substantial risk of
forfeiture, and so could not be taxable on receipt; and, third,
even if the partnership interests were transferred and not
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, the value of the
interests was so speculative that they were worth, at most,
$1,000 each. The Tax Court, reaffirming the viability of Diamond
v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd 492 F.2d 286 (CA7 1974),
found that the taxpayer recognized income on the receipt of the
partnership interests, and then determined the value of each
(taking into account tax losses, projected cash flow and
projected residuals). The Circuit Court reversed because, first,
the partnership interests received by Campbell were (unlike those
received by Diamond) not transferable and not likely to provide
immediate returns and, second, such partnership interests were,
in reality, only profits interests which had only speculative, if
any, value. The bottom line to the Circuit Court was that the
partnership interests had no fair market value when received by
Campbell and so should not have been included in his income on
receipt.
E. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Pension Fund v.
Personnel, Inc., _ F.2d _, 1992 WL 201108 (CA7 1992). The
Fund brought an action against Personnel, Inc. and Eugene
Perrelle, its sole owner and president, to collect withdrawal
liability of $283,165 owed by Personnel. Under the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendment Act, an employer which withdraws from a
multiemployer pension plan is liable for its pro rata share of
the plan's unfunded vested liability. Personnel leased truck
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drivers to other firms. Under a collective bargaining agreement,
Personnel was required to make contributions to the Fund.
While president of Personnel, Perrelle invested
portions of his savings in real estate. While most of the
investments were unrelated to Personnel, from 1980 to 1985
Personnel's offices were in a building owned by Perrelle, who
received rent from Personnel.
The Fund claimed that Perrelle's real estate activities
constituted a trade or business, because under §1301(b)(1) of the
Act, each trade or business under common control is jointly and
severally liable for the withdrawal of another such business.
The Court, reversing the District Court, found that Perrelle's
"real estate activities rose to the level of a trade or business
because they were continuous and regular and designed to produce
income." This was, in the Court's view, attributable to the
facts that "Perrelle's real estate activities were quite
substantial and were designed to produce income. * * * Even
though Perrelle's leasing activity did not produce a net gain
after deductions for depreciation, mortgage and other expenses,
he received constant benefits from his investment. * * *
Perrelle's investments in real estate were more than personal
investments, such as holding shares of stock or bonds in publicly
traded corporations."
F. Citron v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 200 (1991). In 1980, the
taxpayer borrowed $60,000 and, with three other partners,
invested in a limited partnership to produce a motion picture.
The general partner of the partnership was a corporation. The
motion picture was made using the capital contributions of the
partners, and no debt was incurred. After the film was
completed, the negative was taken by the executive producer, who,
as a result of controversy, refused to return it. The
partnership was then dissolved in 1981. The taxpayer reported an
ordinary loss of $60,000 on his return for the year of the
partnership dissolution, on the theory of loss from theft,
embezzlement or abandonment. The Service disallowed the ordinary
loss and argued that any loss was from a sale or exchange, and
thus a capital loss. The Court held that, because of the genuine
dispute between the executive producer and the partnership, there
could not be a theft or embezzlement. However, the Court held
that the taxpayer had evidenced his intention to abandon the
partnership interest (as difficult as that was, because a
partnership interest is intangible personal property) by voting
to dissolve the partnership and by communicating to the general
partner that he no longer had an interest in the partnership or
the motion picture. Finally, the Court decided that, because no
partnership liabilities existed, so that the taxpayer could not
be said to have been directly or constructively paid any
consideration for his partnership interest, there was no sale or
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exchange that occurred on the abandonment, and so an ordinary
loss was allowed.
G. Colorado. Ltd. v. Comm'r, 63 TCM 2435 (1992). The
taxpayer was a Texas limited partnership formed to purchase, own,
renovate, lease, operate and manage an office building. The
taxpayer purchased the building from another entity (FNL) after
FNL had expended an extensive amount in connection with the
qualified rehabilitation of the building. The taxpayer purchased
the building for $9,000,000 under a Texas earnest money contract,
and the taxpayer had an actual adjusted basis in the building of
$6,920,543.
The taxpayer expended a total of $740,500 in 1983 and
1984 for qualified rehabilitation expenditures. FNL expended
$1,978,000 for qualified rehabilitation expenditures before
selling the building to the taxpayer, none of which expenditures
were claimed for rehabilitation tax credit purposes by FNL.
FNL's adjusted basis in the building before the qualified
rehabilitation was begun in $1,814,846.
The issue was whether the taxpayer was entitled to any
rehabilitation tax credit, the resolution of which turned on the
measurement standards. The taxpayer claimed that the total
qualified rehabilitation expenditures (or $2,718,500 ($740,500
plus $1,978,000)) had to be compared to FNL's (the seller's)
adjusted basis immediately before the commencement of the
rehabilitation (or $1,814,846), and so the taxpayer was entitled
to the credit. The Service contended that the taxpayer's basis
less the rehabilitation expenditures made by FNL (or $4,942,543
($6,920,543 less $1,978,000)) had to be compared to the qualified
rehabilitation expenditures, including those made by FNL but
treated as incurred by the taxpayer (or $2,718,500 ($740,500 plus
$1,978,000)), and so the taxpayer was not entitled to the credit.
The Court agreed with the Service, holding that the taxpayer was
not eligible for the rehabilitation tax credit.
H. CottaQe SavinQs Ass'n. v. Comm'r, 111 S.Ct. 1503
(1991). The taxpayer, a savings and loan association formerly
regulated by the FHLBB, held a portfolio of residential real
estate mortgages the market value of which had declined as the
result of rising interest rates. The taxpayer sought to dispose
of these mortgages at a loss in order to generate tax refunds
without recording the loss for regulatory accounting purposes.
To accomplish this, the taxpayer entered into a concurrent sale
transaction with another thrift whereby the taxpayer sold a 90%
participation interest in its depreciated portfolio of mortgages
to the other thrift and simultaneously purchased from the other
thrift a 90% participation interest in another portfolio of
residential mortgages. The taxpayer reported the transaction as
a loss on its tax return for the year (measured by the difference
between the taxpayer's basis in the mortgages sold and their
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then-fair market value), even though the taxpayer was not
required to report the loss under then-existing FHLBB accounting
rules.
The Supreme Court upheld the taxpayer's reporting
position and sustained the recognition of the loss on its
disposition of the mortgage portfolio. In doing so, the Supreme
Court concluded that properties differ materially if their
respective owners "enjoy legal entitlements that are different in
kind or extent". The Court added that the differences between
assets need only be minimal in order to satisfy the
administrative purposes underlying the realization requirement.
The Court found that the participation interests exchanged
involved different legal entitlements given that the mortgages
contained in each portfolio represented loans made to different
borrowers and were secured by different properties.
I. Depot Investors, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 63 TCM 2344 (1992).
An individual purchased a railroad depot from a city, incurring
the obligation either to demolish the depot or remove it by a
specified deadline. The depot was subsequently acquired by a
corporation, which then transferred it to the taxpayer, a
partnership, as a capital contribution. The partnership moved
the depot, incurring site preparation, construction and
rehabilitation expenses. After modifications were made in the
course of relocation and rehabilitation, the structure retained
less than 75% of its original vertical exterior walls.
The partnership taxpayer was not entitled to a
qualified rehabilitation credit because the structure failed to
retain 75% or more of its existing walls in place as external or
internal walls in the rehabilitation process, and, thus, was not
a qualified rehabilitated building. In making its determination,
the Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the vertical,
triangular and trapezoidal rises of a roof should be included
within the term "external wall" for purposes of the 75%
calculation.
J. Echols v. Comm'r, 935 F.2d 703 (CA5 1991), rev'g 93
T.C. 553 (1989). The taxpayer owned a 37.5 percent interest in a
Texas limited partnership, the only asset of which was a tract of
unimproved land in Houston. The down payment for the land was
made with a loan secured by the partnership and guaranteed
personally by the taxpayer and another partner. The remainder of
the purchase price was secured by purchase money debt on a
nonrecourse basis. The partnership had anticipated that a new
highway would be built next to the land, so that the land could
be sold at a profit. Everything then changed -- the plans for
the highway were dropped due to local opposition, and Houston
real estate went into a slump. Thereafter, taxpayer acquired
another 37.5 percent for the assumption of the second guarantor
partner's guarantee, and thereafter paid off the recourse debt in
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full. When taxpayer found that he could no longer carry his 75
percent of the debt service and real estate taxes, he called a
meeting of the partners and told the holder of the other 25
percent that he was foregoing his partnership interest, and that
he would give it to anyone who would pick up his share of the
nonrecourse debt. From that point, the taxpayer contributed
nothing further for real estate taxes or debt service. The
Circuit Court, reversing the Tax Court, held that the taxpayer
had clearly evidenced his intention to abandon his partnership
interest in the tax year claimed, and so was entitled to a loss
deduction in that year. As the Circuit Court noted, by the
taxpayer telling the other partners that the taxpayer would
contribute no more funds to the partnership, the taxpayer was
making a "clear and unequivocal indication to [the other partner]
and the world" that the taxpayer was "walking from their
ownership interest", and the taxpayer "kept that vow, never
thereafter to return to acts of ownership toward or contributions
to the partnership." The Circuit Court found that the Tax Court
had erroneously focused on the partnership's abandonment of the
real estate, rather than only the taxpayer's abandonment of his
partnership interest. The Circuit Court also found that the
facts demonstrated, beyond bona fide challenge, that the
taxpayer's interest in the partnership was, in the tax year
claimed, both worthless in fact and deemed worthless by taxpayer.
K. Emershaw v. Comm'r, 949 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1991).
Corporation X made three separate purchases of computer equipment
from IBM at an aggregate cost of $2,935,143. The equipment was
then leased to several "end users", which took possession of the
equipment and used it in their businesses. The purchases were
financed by loans which were secured by the equipment as well as
subsequent leases of the equipment. After entering into the
leases, Corporation X then sold the computer equipment to
Corporation Y for a price of $3,030,300. The purchase was made
subject to the existing leases and bank liens and was paid for
with a down payment of $180,000 and a full recourse installment
note for the balance.
The equipment was subsequently sold to Partnership Z, a
limited partnership, subject to the bank liens and the rights of
existing leaseholders. Part of the purchase price was paid with
a "partial recourse secured promissory note" from Partnership Z.
Partnership Z then leased the equipment back to Corporation X,
subject to the bank liens, the rights of existing lease holders
and the security interest of Corporation Y. This leasing
transaction included a guaranty of rental obligations to
Partnership Z by Corporation P, the parent of Corporation X.
The Tax Court held that the limited partners of
Partnership Z were "at risk" for their pro rata share of a
partial recourse note issued in connection with the sale-
leaseback transaction because the partnership was ultimately
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liable on the note. The partners were at risk because the
partnership would be liable if the lessor became bankrupt, and
such "at risk" status was unaffected by the rent guaranty made by
the lessor's parent corporation.
L. Frane's Estate v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 341 (1992). In 1982,
the decedent organized a corporation, which issued to him 5,000
shares of common stock and 89,845 shares of convertible preferred
stock. Shortly thereafter, he sold 1,250 shares of such common
stock to each of his four children pursuant to separate, but
identical, purchase agreements. Each child executed, pursuant to
the purchase agreement, a promissory note, payable in 20 equal
installments (together with interest on the unpaid principal
balance at 12 percent per annum). Each note provided that,
unless sooner paid, "all sums due hereunder, whether principal or
interest, shall be deemed cancelled and extinguished as though
paid upon the death of Robert E. Frane."
Payments on the notes were made in 1983 and 1984.
Decedent died in July 1984, leaving a substantial unpaid
principal balance on each note. The estate did not report any
gain attributable to the promissory notes held by the decedent at
his death.
The Court, noting that under the express terms of the
notes the children's installment obligations to pay decedent were
cancelled on the decedent's death, found that "Section 453B(f)
explicitly provides that the cancellation of an installment
obligation shall be treated as a taxable disposition of such
obligation." The Court further found that, as a result, "each
installment obligation is treated as if were disposed of in a
transaction other than a sale or exchange by decedent. Sec.
453B(f)(i). Further, because the obligor (each of decedent's
children) and the obligee (decedent) are related, gain was
recognized equal in amount to the excess of the face amount of
the obligations over basis 'at the time of' the transaction --
the date of decedent's death. Sec. 453B(a)(2), (f)(2). The face
amount of each installment obligation is equal to the remaining
unpaid principal amount which was cancelled."
M. Henkind v. Comm'r, 64 TCM 807 (1992). The taxpayers
were limited partners in an automobile leasing limited
partnership. Before entering the partnership, the taxpayers
carefully investigated the profit potential of car leasing. In
addition, projections of profits were made on the basis of
reasonable assumptions. Moreover, the business was operated in a
businesslike manner on a full-time basis, and the general partner
had extensive, long-time experience in auto leasing. At the time
the partners entered the activity, economic conditions favored
the leasing industry.
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The Court found that, for purposes of Sec. 183, I.R.C.,
the taxpayers established that the auto leasing activity was
carried on by the partnership with the actual and honest
objective of making a profit.
Furthermore, the Court found that the underlying
partnership debts to be paid through additional capital
contributions which could be called by the general partner under
the partnership agreement were loans negotiated by the
partnership at arm's length with unrelated financial
institutions. (This distinguished the situation in Pritchett v.
Comm'r, 85 T.C. 580 (1985), rev'd and remanded 827 F.2d 644 (CA9
1987).) The general partner had every incentive to make the
calls for additional capital contributions because the majority
shareholder of the general partner was personally the guarantor
of the bank loans, and the limited partners could not elect out
of the overcall provision or unilaterally reduce their
obligations. Finally, the Court held that the obligations to
make additional capital contributions were definite and fixed,
and not subject to any stop-loss protection. Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the taxpayers were at risk under Sec.
465(b)(3), I.R.C., and entitled to deduct the losses claimed.
N. HGA Cinema Trust v. Comm'r, 950 F.2d 1357 (CA7 1991).
A trust held a 5.56% interest in the profits and losses of a
limited partnership from 1978 through 1981. Corporations X and Y
purchased certain computer equipment from users and then leased
the equipment back to the users. To finance the purchase, the
corporations obtained nonrecourse loans secured by liens on the
equipment and an assignment of rental payments. In 1978, X and Y
entered into several agreements with Corporations A and B
involving the sale and leaseback of certain computer equipment.
On the same date, A and B sold this equipment to Corporation Z,
which assumed all rights and obligations of A and B under the
leaseback agreements with X and Y.
The Service ruled that a limited partner was liable for
deficiencies because long-term notes held by the partnership did
not represent a valid debt for which the partnership was "at
risk". A genuine debt did not exist because the partnership had
no obligation to pay on the notes unless the lessee paid the
rent. Thus, the partnership could defer payment on the notes to
the extent that it did not receive rentals and, when the lease
ended, the partnership could offset the notes with the deferred
amounts.
0. Holywell Corporation v. Smith, 112 S.Ct. 1021 (1992).
The debtors, four corporate entities and an individual, filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. The creditors approved a
reorganization plan which failed to provide for the filing of tax
returns or the payment of any taxes due. The Supreme Court,
reversing the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Smith, 911
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F.2d 1539 (CA 11 1990), held that a trustee in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding is required to file income tax returns that
the debtors would have filed had the property of the estate not
been assigned to the trustee.
With respect to the corporate debtors, the Court held
that the trustee is an "assignee" of "all or substantially all"
of the property of the corporation within the meaning of Sec.
6012(b) (3), I.R.C. and is therefore required to file.
With respect to the individual debtor, the Court ruled
that the trustee is required by Sec. 6012(b)(4), I.R.C. to file a
return because he is a fiduciary of a trust. The Court applied
the trust characterization because the plan was described as a
trust and was created for the express purpose of liquidating the
debtor's estate and distributing it to creditors and, thus,
clearly fit within the description of a liquidating trust. The
Court rejected arguments that the individual debtor must pay the
trust's taxes under the grantor trust rules and that the trustee
lacked sufficient discretion to be a fiduciary.
The trustee argued that there is no obligation to file
a return in a case in which the plan does not require the payment
of taxes by the trustee. The Court observed that, although
Section 1141(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that the provisions
of a confirmed plan bind any creditor, that provision does not
preclude the United States from seeking the payment of any taxes.
Furthermore, although Section 1141(a) binds creditors with
respect to pre-confirmation claims, the plan does not bind them
with respect to post-confirmation claims. The filing and tax
payment obligations in question here were obligations arising
after confirmation of the plan and appointment of the trustee.
P. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 112 S.Ct. 1039, 92-2 USTC
50,113 (1992). In 1977, National Starch and Chemical Corp.
retained lawyers and investment bankers to assist in evaluating
an offer by Unilever to acquire all of the National Starch stock.
National Starch paid more than $2,800,000 in fees and expenses
related to the acquisition, which was ultimately in fact
completed.
National Starch deducted the expenses as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under Sec. 162, I.R.C. In doing so,
the taxpayer relied on Comm'r v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n,
403 U.S. 345 (1971), interpreting that case as requiring
capitalization only if the payment in question served to create
or enhance a separate and distinct asset. The Court rejected
such interpretation out of hand.
The Court then placed its focus on two considerations.
First, whether the expenditures generated a future benefit beyond
the year in which they were incurred. Second, whether the
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purpose of such expenditures was to change the corporate
structure or improve operations in a way that would produce
future benefits. The Court, asserting that the "mere presence of
an incidental future benefit -- 'some future aspect' -- may not
warrant capitalization", found that this transaction produced
"significant" future benefits for National Starch. Accordingly,
the Court held that the expenditures were not deductible, and had
to be capitalized.
Q. Jacobson v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 577 (1991). Taxpayers
owned 100% of partnership X. Partnership X and individual A
formed partnership Y in which they held respective ownership
interests of 25% and 75%. Partnership X transferred real
property to partnership Y and A transferred to partnership Y a
cash amount equal to 75% of the value of the property. The cash
was immediately transferred to partnership X. Taxpayers reported
the transaction as a Sec. 721 contribution of property to
partnership Y, followed by a Sec. 731 distribution to taxpayers
from partnership Y. The Court held that the transaction was not
subject to the treatment accorded by Secs. 721 and 731. Instead,
the transaction must be treated as a taxable sale of 75% of the
real property to A, the cash contributor.
R. In re Kreidle, 91-2 USTC 50,371 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1991). The taxpayer was a 50 percent partner in a general
partnership. He was also an officer and director of several
related corporations, for which he guaranteed a substantial
amount of debt. Between the partnership debt and his guarantees,
taxpayer was personally liable for over $8,000,000. Taxpayer
went into Chapter 11. Taxpayer had a $2,000,000 basis in the
partnership, which became worthless by virtue of the filing of
Chapter 11. The Service claimed that the loss was a capital
loss, but the Bankruptcy Court held that the loss was an ordinary
loss. The Court noted that (1) there was no actual distribution
or transfer of property out of the partnership to the taxpayer,
and the taxpayer did not receive anything when it became
worthless; and (2) there was no deemed distribution at that time
under Sec. 752, I.R.C. because there was no discharge of
liabilities, inasmuch as taxpayer remained personally liable on
the partnership's debts. The Court noted that the Service had
itself allowed an ordinary loss deduction in a similar situation
in Rev. Rul. 70-355, 1970-2 C.B. 51, which had never been
overruled or modified (even though in Rev. Rul. 76-189, 1976-1
C.B. 181, the Service had reached a contrary result on similar
facts). The Court also cited TeJon Ranch Co. and Subsidiaries v.
Comm'r, 49 TCM 1357 (1985); Zeeman v. United States, 275 F.Supp.
235 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); and Gannon v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 1134 (1951),
in all of which ordinary losses were allowed on the worthlessness
of investments in partnerships.
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S. In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 133 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1991). The trustee of a bankruptcy estate requested
authority from the Bankruptcy Court to abandon an apartment
building back to the bankrupt. Under 11 U.S.C. §554, the trustee
of a bankruptcy estate may abandon property of the estate if the
property is either "burdensome to the estate" or "of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate". The bankrupt
objected, first, because, it claimed, the abandonment did not fit
into either statutory definition and, second, because, it
asserted, the abandonment "would shift foreclosure tax
consequences from the bankruptcy estates to the Debtor and would
destroy the Debtor's opportunity for a fresh start."
The Court agreed that the property was "unquestionably
encumbered beyond [its] value". However, because a "cram-down"
plan could be utilized, the Court noted that the secured claims
could be effectively reduced to the value of their mortgage
interests. Furthermore, abandonment was, in the Court's view,
unnecessary because the property could be removed from the
bankruptcy estate just as easily by not objecting to the then-
pending foreclosure sale of the property.
Importantly, the Court found that abandonment could not
be allowed because of the Federal income tax consequences, buying
the arguments made by the bankrupt. The bankrupt argued that the
bankrupt estate would in any event be taxed under one or more of
three theories. First, abandonment would be a taxable event in
any event because it constitutes a sale or exchange of the
property. Second, under Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S.
331 (1945), the impending foreclosure sale could not be
transformed by the bankrupt through a prior tax-motivated
transfer. Finally, abandonment would not escape taxation under
Sec. 1398(f) (2), I.R.C., as a transfer at the "termination of the
estate".
The Court was, at the bottom line, most concerned that
the "tax burden would inhibit the Debtor's fresh start. Section
554 should be interpreted in a fashion which promotes the
Debtor's fresh start where, as here, there is no countervailing
consideration which overrides the fresh start policy."
T. Mark IV Pictures, Inc. v. Comm'r, 969 F.2d 669 (CA8
1992), aff'g 60 TCM 1171 (1990). The taxpayers acquired general
partner interests in several limited partnerships formed for the
purpose of producing, distributing and exhibiting motion
pictures. The taxpayers developed or otherwise acquired rights
to the original story ideas and prepared scripts before forming
the limited partnerships and contributing such items to such
partnerships. The general partners performed ongoing services
for the partnerships, including raising funds, producing the
movies and releasing and distributing the films. The general
partners were paid for producing the movies, and were to be paid
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out of receipts for their release and distribution efforts.
These payments were based on what the general partners believed
were reasonable charges for the services.
The Service determined that the general partner
interests were capital interests in the partnerships representing
additional compensation for services rendered to the partnerships
by the general partners. The Court, affirming the Tax Court,
concurred.
The Court noted that the partnership interests received
by the general partners were entitled to 50 percent of the
profits and losses and the liquidating proceeds of the
partnerships. However, the Court interpreted state law to mean
that, nonetheless, the limited partners were entitled to a return
of their capital contributions prior to the time that the general
partners would receive any liquidating proceeds.
The Court, affirming the Tax Court, held that,
notwithstanding the contribution of such film rights, the general
partner interests were received entirely for services because the
general partners could not prove that they were compensated fully
for all services they performed for the partnerships. The Court
further held that, even though there might be no partnership
liquidating proceeds remaining to be distributed to the general
partners after creditors and the limited partners (to the extent
of their capital contributions) were fully satisfied,
nevertheless, because the general partners had the right to
receive a share of the partnership assets, they were deemed to
receive capital interests in the partnerships on their
acquisition of the general partner interests.
U. McLennan v. United States, 24 Cl.Ct. 102 (Cl. Ct.
1991). Taxpayer made a charitable contribution of a scenic
easement to a non-profit corporation. The corporation was
dedicated to the cause of nature preservation and conservation,
and the easement solicited from taxpayer restricted the future
use of the land in accordance with the objectives of the donee.
It was asserted that the taxpayer participated in the scenic
easement program to maintain property values and to receive a tax
deduction and, as such, lacked the required donative intent and
exclusive conservation purpose at the time of the transfer.
Further support for this position was found in the fact that
taxpayer sought reconveyance of the easement following
disallowance of a significant portion of the charitable
contribution.
After consideration of the circumstances involved, the
Court permitted the taxpayer to claim the charitable deduction
for the value of the scenic easement contribution, finding
satisfaction of both the donative intent and conservation purpose
requirements. The Court recognized that, although a taxpayer
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must not expect a substantial benefit as quid pro quo for a
charitable contribution, the charitable nature of a contribution
is not vitiated by the receipt of a benefit incidental to a
greater public benefit.
V. Moore v. Comm'r, 62 TCM 1128 (1991). Taxpayers made
gifts of certain partnership interests, with each interest
transferred to each individual or entity representing less than a
one percent interest in the partnership. The amounts reported by
the taxpayers for gift tax purposes did not reflect a pro rata
share of the net asset value of the partnership. Rather, the
reported amount reflected a 40% discount from the pro rata share
of the net asset value, reflecting a lack of control and a lack
of liquidity associated with the interests. After consideration
of expert testimony, the Court concluded that, in valuation of
the partnership interests for gift tax purposes, it was proper
that the calculation incorporate minority and lack of
marketability discounts.
The determination of the amount of such a discount
requires a consideration of many factors. In establishing an
appropriate discount for lack of control associated with an
interest, taxpayers' expert considered the following factors: (1)
inability to select managers; (2) lack of control over management
policies; (3) lack of control of salaries of managers; and (4)
inability to control asset acquisitions or dispositions. In
establishing an appropriate discount for lack of liquidity, the
following factors were considered: (1) absence of an established
market; (2) inability to force liquidation; (3) no expectation of
consent to liquidation of assets; (4) consent requirement for
assignment; (5) consent requirement for withdrawal; (6) first
refusal option to remaining partners upon withdrawal, combined
with a market glut for such properties, indicated that any
exercise of such option would be at a discount; and (7)
withdrawal without consent would not discharge withdrawing
partner from additional liabilities incurred by the partnership.
W. Nalle v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. _ , No. 9 (1992). The
taxpayer was a partner in a joint venture which purchased two
historic houses and moved them to a historic office subdivision,
where they were rehabilitated. In addition, the taxpayer
personally purchased six buildings, which were transported to the
same historic office subdivision, where they were rehabilitated.
The Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to any
rehabilitation tax credit because, under Reg. S1.48-12(b)(5), the
location of each of the buildings was changed prior to
rehabilitation. The Court noted that "Congress envisioned that
the rehabilitation tax credit would provide a financial incentive
for existing businesses to improve their facilities and plants in
older locations rather than to abandon those facilities for
another locale. Similarly, the credit would provide an incentive
for new businesses to locate in such areas. * * * As we see it,
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the removal of a building from a declining area of an inner city
or community will provide little or no economic benefit to that
area."
X. United States v. Nordic VillaQe, Inc., 112 S.Ct 1011
(1992). In March 1984, Nordic Village, Inc. filed for
reorganization under Chapter 11. Later in 1984, Mr. Lah, an
officer and shareholder, drew a $26,000 check on the bankrupt's
account and used $20,000 of such amount to obtain a cashier's
check payable to the Service, which he used for his personal tax
liability. In December 1984, the bankruptcy trustee sued the
Service for the recovery of the money. The Service lost at the
Bankruptcy Court, District Court and Court of Appeals levels,
although it raised sovereign immunity, for the first time, at the
Sixth Circuit level. The Supreme Court reversed, based on
sovereign immunity.
This decision may well limit the bankrupt trustee's
power to recover funds from the Federal Government, except tax
refunds under 11 U.S.C. §505(a) (2) and perhaps in counterclaim
situations. See also United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462
U.S. 198 (1983), where the Service was ordered (under 11 U.S.C.
§542(a)) to return property it had seized before the debtor's
petition was filed because the property was necessary to the
debtor's reorganization.
Y. In re Olson, 930 F.2d 6 (CA8 1991). The taxpayer was a
bankruptcy estate. The debtors in the underlying Chapter 7
bankruptcy case owned two tracts of land which were subject to a
bank mortgage. The trustee in bankruptcy abandoned the real
estate during the pendency of the case, and such real estate was
eventually sold at a gain in foreclosure proceedings by the bank
which held a mortgage on the property. The tax return which was
filed on behalf of the bankruptcy estate reported gain realized
from the sale of the land as a liability of the estate for the
tax. The gain was treated as realized by the bankruptcy estate
upon the abandonment of the land by the trustee. The Court held
that (1) there was no recognized gain or loss to the bankruptcy
estate upon the abandonment of the property, and (2) the gain
which was realized upon the sale of the property was income of
the debtor, not the bankruptcy estate, because after the property
was abandoned by the trustee it became property of the debtor.
Z. ReQents Park Partners v. Comm'r, 63 TCM 3131 (1992).
The taxpayer, after months of negotiation, obtained two apartment
buildings from HUD. The Service made a number of arguments,
including that (i) the property acquisition was a sham
transaction and (ii) because the nonrecourse debt, to which the
property was subject at the time of the acquisition, unreasonably
exceeded the fair market value of the property, such debt must be
excluded in full in determining the partnership's basis in the
property.
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Because of the nature of the negotiations with HUD,
with which the taxpayer clearly was not related, as well as the
structure of the financing and the degree of adherence to
contractual terms, the Court was satisfied that the terms of the
deal were the result of arm's-length negotiations. Accordingly,
the Court was "persuaded that the transaction had economic
substance. Consequently, the transaction was not a sham."
Furthermore, the Court found that the debt exceeded the
fair market value of the property. The Service argued that this
meant that the debt should therefore be fully excluded from
basis. However, the Court found that the taxpayer still "had a
legitimate economic interest to continue to make payments on the
debt, and that it was unlikely to abandon or walk away from the
transaction." Accordingly, the Court held that "under the
particular circumstances of this case, which involves, inter
alia, the acquisition of property subject to nonrecourse
indebtedness that exceeds its fair market value, the partnership
is entitled to a basis in the amount of the property's fair
market value; and the indebtedness, to the extent that it exceeds
fair market value, is treated as a contingent liability, and not
as an addition to basis." The Court thus followed Pleasant
Summit Land Corp. v. Comm'r, 863 F.2d 263 (CA3 1988), rather than
Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045 (CA9 1976), aff'g on
different grounds 64 T.C. 752 (1975). See also Sec. 752(c),
I.R.C.
AA. Soliman v. Comm'r, 935 F.2d 52 (CA4 1991), cert.
granted. The Circuit Court affirmed the Tax Court's formulation
of a new "facts and circumstances" test in holding that the
taxpayer, an anesthesiologist who worked at three hospitals, but
was not provided an office at any of them, was entitled to a home
office deduction under Sec. 280A (c)(1), I.R.C. The "facts and
circumstances" test replaces the former "focal point" test, which
looked to the place where the goods and services were provided to
customers and revenues were generated.
The "facts and circumstances" test provides that, where
management or administrative activities are essential to the
taxpayer's trade or business, and the only available office space
is in the taxpayer's home, the "home office" can be the
taxpayer's principal place of business where (1) the office in
the home is essential to the taxpayer's business; (2) the
taxpayer spends a substantial amount of time there; and (3) there
is no other location available for performance of the office
functions of the business.
BB. West v. Comm'r, 61 TCM 1694 (1991). In accordance with
the delinquency charge provisions of their mortgage loan,
taxpayers paid approximately $1,000 for such charges during the
tax year and attempted to deduct such payments as interest. In
Rev. Rul. 74-187, 1974-1 C.B. 48, the Service held that a late
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penalty charge assessed by a public utility is deductible as
interest. The Tax Court declined to follow Rev. Rul. 74-187,
observing that the late charge in this case was assessed
primarily to recoup costs attendant in the bank's attempt to
collect the delinquent loan. In the cited Revenue Ruling, the
Service assumed that the late payment charge was for the use or
forbearance of money. The Court held that late payment charges
on a mortgage were not deductible as a mortgage interest expense.
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